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g. , classification and clearance) security and the File
Storage System Supervisor is responsible for discretionary
(e.g., "need to know") security. Multilevel security is achieved
by the controlled access to consolidated file storage by Host
computer systems. Multiprogramming of surrogate Supervisor
processes operating on behalf of the Host computer systems provides
for system efficiency. A segmented memory at the Supervisor
level allows controlled data sharing among authorized users.
System integrity is independent of the internal security controls
(or lack of them) in the distributed systems; the File Storage
System prevents system-wide security side effects. A loop free
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A design for a secure, multi-user, File Storage System
is developed. This design, incorporating a concurrently
developed Security Kernel, provides a multilevel secure
flexible file storage serving a distributed system of
dissimilar computers. The Security Kernel is responsible for
non-discretionary (e.g., classification and clearance)
security and the File Storage System Supervisor is
resporsible for discretionary (e.g., "reed to know")
security. Multilevel security is achieved by the controlled
access to consolidated file storage for Host computer
systems. Multi programming of surrogate Supervisor processes
operating on behalf of the Host computer systems provides
for system efficiency, h segmented memory at the Supervisor
level allows controlled data sharing among authorized users.
System integrity is independent of the internal security
controls 'or lark of them) in the distributed systems; the
File Storage System prevents system-wide security side
effects. 5 loop free structure along with system simplicity
and robustness are design characteristics.
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Lac v of data security is a ?e rtral issue in computer
science today, ^ata security car be divided into external
physical aspects (i.e., guards, fences, etc.) and irt Q rnal
systerr aspects 'i.e., internal software and hardware
operations'1 ; both of which are necessary for effective
system security. The physical aspect is understood and does
no*. p n se a significant problem today. Continued loses (viz.,
money, data' die to computer 'error', illustrate that the
second aspect of data security, viz., internal security, has
not beer, solved and continues to be a problem.
T h i ^ short coming results frc^ the fact that internal
computer security has not beer, a mandatory design objective
during hardware and/or software selection and/or production
in most (if ^o* all) contemporary computer systems. This
renders them prone to security violations from accidential
or malicious penetrations [Schell(l)]. Ad hoc attempts to
provide the necessary system security in the later stages of
the system design or implementation have not ~en c rally met
with success.
In contrast, this thesis presents a design for a
multilevel secure computer operating system, the File
Storage System i.YSS) in which internal computer security is
a primary design objective. There are two ?oals "his system
is designed to achieve: 1) to provide sharing of data among
authorized users a^d, 2) control access to a consolidated
'warehouse' of data. This controlled access to consolidated
9

data, predicates a 'star' network for the system structure
as depicted in figure 1. It must be noted, however, that the
?SS ca^rct control the physical security cf the Host systems
ard that 'T ost systems have the ability to circumvent "PS
5
security by direct inter-Host communication links. To
preserve data security, all accesses to the 7SS consolidated
data rrust gn through the 7SS for access validation.
Data sharing anions authorized users is accomplished by a
segmented environment which allows controlled direct access
to all on-line data. The Security Kernel 'or simply Kernel)
is used to insure that non-discretionary date access is
performed in an absolutely controlled ''i.e., secure) manner.
'See [Coleman] for detailed information en the Security
Kernel.)
A. PRC3LSM DEFINITION
'it is illogical to ignore the fact that computers may
disseminate information to anyone who knows how tc ask for
it, completely bypassing the expensive controls Placed- o^
paper circulation." [Schell(l)]
That this fact is ignored is demonstrated by the
estimated I??, million dollars lost yearly by non-secure
computer systems in the United States [Denning(2)l . It is
obvious that a primary problem/limitation of computer
systems in use f>day is the lack of data security. As
recuirements to store and access data by computer increase,
this problem/limitation cannot bethe serious r ess o
ignored
.
A system that can simultaneously provide data at
10
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different sensitivity (viz., classification ) levels for
users with different access authorizations (viz.,
"clearances") without a security violation is said to be a
multilevel secure system. "Because it is usually rot
desirable to authorize all system users access to the
highest level of data ''system high.') or provide separate
'without sharing) systems for each level of data, a
multilevel system is highly desirable. \ multilevel system
also allows the raxiTum amount of controlled data sharing
amor<? authorized users, a primary eoal of any lata storage
system.
Previous research shows that a viable approach to the
auestior. of internal computer security exists. This
approach, sometimes termed the security kernel approach
[Schell'2)], was introduced by Schell in 1972. It gathers
into o^e? module all elements that effect the system
security. The module, by bein^ restricted in size, can be
verified correct which in turn allows the total system to be
certifed secure.
The F5S software is composed of the Supervisor and the
Kernel. It will provide a multilevel secure consolidated
file storage for distributed Host computer systems. The
non-discretionary security provided by the Kernel ari the
discretionary security provided ty the Supervisor will
implement a wide ran«;e of security uolicies, including the
standard Department of Defense (DOD) security policies. Data
sharing is achieved by a segmented memory environment at the
12

Supervisor level. The Supervisor uses segments (invisible to
the Host systems) to construct the Host files. Multilevel
security is achieve! by the management of files submitted "by
the Host systems which e^ist at distinct security levels.
This allows the construction of a multilevel secure system




The dramatic reduction in size and cost along with the
increase in performance of microprocessors in the last
decade has made their use feasible in areas that have
previously hee^ reserved for ni^i/maxi computers for rot
computed at all). Whereas security has teen notoriously
lacking i** the larger systems, it has been no^-existent i r
microprocessors to date.
Because of their small siz°, low cost, durability, ari,
perhaps most importantly, the manpower savings induce! ''just
to mention a few of many advantages), microprocessors have
hish aupeal for use in a military environment. However, the
military also has an obvious need for security within their
computer systems, whether they are micro, mini, or maxi
based .
For example, the Navy is presently considering systems
for the ne ,r t generation of non-tactical shipboard computers







Cost. siz° a^d speed constraints will sccr be net fcy
Commercially available products. Security, however,
continues to be a problem not adequately addressed in any
available systems. To preserve data confidentiality (not
only with respect to clearance le" r el tut also with respect
to the current stipulations of the Privacy *ct), security is
a necessary part of any shipbnard computer system. Pay
records. for example, should not have the same access level
as maintenance records. In order to store records in a
common data base and to have controlled sharing when
aopropriate, the computer must be able tc maintain a
multilevel secure environment.
Th Q re are several possible approaches to achieve a
secure multilevel environment. The frontal approach, which
is most difficult, is to certify all distributed computers
which have access to the data base as secure. k second
method and the method adopted for the FSS , is to cerfify
only one element of the FSS secur°
—
the Security Kernel. -11
access to the VSS that involves non-discretionary security
will be validated by the Kernel. The FSS therefore
guarantees to manage files in a manner consista.it with the
FSS security policies.
The design for the "S3 is one membe" of a family of




Security, configuration independence, and a loon-free
structure a r e characteristics of this family of systems.
P. EASIC T)"FFI NIT IONS
1 . Securi ty
'lthcugh any viable secure system includes both
internal and external aspects, relying excessively on
external controls is not desirable in many cases due to the
added expenses and increased security risks involved in
error-prone manual procedures. External controls also cannot
provide the secure sharing of data that is needed ir. such
applications as integrated data bases and computer networks,
primary characteristics of the FSS . The use of the Kernel
concept is a demonstratively effective and practical method
for providing the internal computer security controls that
are necessary fnr a secure multilevel system. This concept
is at the center of the T SS design.
The basic co^.cex)* behind this approach is that a
small ucrtion of hardware/software, the Kernel, can. provide
the internal security controls that are effective against
all attacks, (malicious or accidental) including those never
thought if by the designer. (This also means that errors in
the 7SS Supervisor cannot cause unauthorized access tc
data. )
System security is the implementation of a security
policy. This uolicy is a collection of lavs, rules, and
regulations that establish the rules for access to the data
15

in the system. Such policies, such as the one established by
the DCD. have two distinct1 aspects: discretionary and
non-discretionary security. Non-discretionary security
ex tern ally constrains what access is possible. In the DOD
environment , the familiar non-discretionary security levels
are* top secret. secret. confidential, and unclassified.
Since most contemporary computer systems do not provide the
data labeling necessary to support non-discretionary
security, all data is implicitly accessible. In the ?SS,
segmentation allows unioue id ent if icat i on and labeling of
data; non-discretionary security is therefore supported. The
Kernel is the one element in the FS3 responsible for
enforcing non-discretionary security.
Non-discretionary security involves the comparing of
the access class of a specific object (object access class,
oac)) with the access class of the reouestor (subject
access class, 'sac)) to insure compatibility. In a DOD
environment, for example, a person (subject) with sac of
secret has access to files (objects) at any access class
eaual to or less tha^ secret. The relationships between
different access classes are represented by a partially
ordered lattice structure [r'e rining( 1 ) ] . This lattice
represents the authorized access based on the relationships
of two levels. An example of the not—related (making the
lattice partially ordered) relationship, occurs because of
DCD com.partrren tali zation (e.g., secret is not related to
secret .nuclear ) . The following accesses are permitted for
16

the relationships represented "by this lattice structure.
sac = oac tread/write access
sac > oac :read accpss ''read down)
sac < oac : write access 'write up)
sac O oac : r. o access (sac not related to oac)
In each case, the Kernel must snow the
identification of the Host system if it is to perform
correct non-discretionary security checks. Unique system
identification is provided by the system pert number, which
is hardwired, and known to the Kernel,
Dis cr°t
i
o^ary security provides a refinement to the
non-discretionary security policy and is reflected in the
DOT "need to know" policy. Computer systems which have
'ccess Control Lists ('ACL ^ associated with data, implement
this discretionary policy. The 755 Supervisor is responsible
for the System discretionary security and although this
aspect of the System security is not validated by the Kernel
(and therefore rot certified correct), the validity of t*>e
non-discretionary security is not affected.
To implement its aspect of security, the Supervisor
needs to know the identification of the Host system "user".
This Host system user identification must be passed to the
7SS Supervisor by the Host system. Since an insecure Host
system cannot be trusted to pass the correct information,
the user identification is only as prood as the Host system
implementation, (i.e.. ^SS discretionary security is only as
17

good as the H^st System's implemer. tatlon of discretionary
security.) This implemen tat ion may be <?ood on some systems,
(e.g., UNIX [Morris]) but, non-existent on other systems
(e.g., CP/M [Digital]). It must be remembered that this in
no way affects the enforcement of the non-discretionary




& process can be described as a locus of execution.
The collection of locations that may be accessed during this
execution is known as the nrocess' address space [Madnick]
.
A process also has the characteristic that it may be
executed in parallel with other •processes, enhancing system
efficiency aH allowing the separation of tas'rs i^t.c
different processes for design clarity.
The FSS has two processes per Host system. These are
an input /output '10) process for Supervisor to "ost data
transfer and comrnuricat ior. end a file management (IM)
process that controls and maintains the Supervisor file
structure. Interprocess communication is achieved by the use
of even tcour.ts , sequencers, and synchronization primitives
internal to the Kernel (described later).
3. Segmentation
Segmentation allows for the direct addr°ssins of all
system on-line information end the application of access
control to this information. Mote that direct addressing
16

ices not mean random access to the on-line infornation. On
the contrary, access to s Dgmerts is controlled by explicit
memory management calls to the Kernel to swap in/out a
segment. A segment can "be defined as a logical grouping of
information such as a subroutine, procedure, data area, or
file. Each processes' address space consists of a collection
of segments. In a segmented environment, all address space
references require two components, a segment specifier and
an offset within that segment. Segmentation is used to
provide the Supervisor domain of each process a virtual
memory of limited size. Segments, as mentioned earlier, are
used by the Supervisor to construct the Host files which
retain the attributes of segments ''i.e., access control).
4. Mul tiprcgrarnmin?
5 mul tipr oar^ammed environment is one in which mere
tha-" one process is in a state of execution at the same
time. These processes share urocessor time, memory, and
other resources among the active processes. In the design
for the "FSS , the Supervisor processes are mult ipro.^rammed in
an asynhcronous manner for system efficiency. A
mul tipro srammin^ environment allows the Host systems to
operate in a logically parallel manner which adds to System
design simplicity and clarity.
5 . Protection Domains
One of the "^ey elements necessary for valid Kernel
19

implementation is the isolation of the Kernel from all
possible outside influences. This car. be lone through the
use of protection domains.
Protection domains are used t n arrange process
address spaces into "rings'* [Schroeder] of different
privilege. This arrangement is a hierarchical structure with
the most privileged domain bein^ the inner most rins. Figure
2 represents the ring or^a^ izat 1 01 in the FSS.
Protection rin.?s may be created by either hardware
or software. Hardware is nore effici ar t but is rot
commercially available in microprocessor devices today. Two
state devices are available, however, ard by i-plerre"" ting
the two states as separate rings and providing for software
ri^g crossing mechanisims, the necessary two protection
rings can be created.
D. SYST3M aSQUIHEMSMTS
There are no fixed hardware reauirements for the
implementation of the FSS. System efficiency does, however,
depend on an ancroioria te choice of hardware. Two basic
hardware features that are felt to be necessary for a viable
i^pleme" + at i nr of the FSS are segmentation and multiple
domains
.
Segmentation is necessary for access control a *> d data
Sharing. fl multiple state ' two in this case) is necessary








Har d va r°
1/« 3a te
'W Gat
Figure 2. Protection Domains
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Only the Kernel has access to privileged machine
instructions aid controls all system input /output . It
provides a segment 3 ! environment in which the Supervisor
operates. The Supervisor iv. turn, provides a virtual file





A secure computer system is not dependent on the
hardware or. which it is implemented. However, as mentioned
above, segmentation and multiple domains are considered
necessary for 7SS efficiency.
Segmentation allows the use of one uniform type of
information object, the segment, at the Kernel level. This
simplifies Kernel design ard contributes to keeping Kern°l
size small. s, segment address consists of a segment name and
offset within the segment. Although this addressing can be
done in software, it is faster and Tore efficient when dore
ir hardware. Hardware can also simultaneously chec> for
authorized access, a necessary feature of a secure system.
Multiple do^ai^s are curr°ntly used in sn^e of the
larger machines to protect the operating systems from the
applications programs. Multiple domains have rot, until
recently, beer, available in a microprocessor configuration.
The FSS design reauires only two domains, "re for the Kernel
and one for the Supervisor.
The introduction of the Zilog Z8000 series
microorocessor meets both the segmentation ard multiple
domain requirements. The FSS is targeted for implementation
on the Z?P01 segmented microprocessor [Ziloe(2)l with its
associated Memory Management Unit (MMU) [Zilog'l)]. The
Z9901 is a 16 bit two-domain machine which produces a 23 bit
23

logical address. The l Q/*\? MMU maps the 23 tit logical
address into a 24 "bit absolute address and allows the
capability of addressing up to 128 segments 'with two MMU's)
of 64K bytes each ^BM-bytes total) in a two-dimensional
memory space. (See [Coleman] for further details.) RS-232
bus compatibility is assumed for serial data input/output at
the hardware level. This allows tyte synchronization and
byte parity checks to be performed at the hardware level by
the ?SS universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART).
B. SYSTEM ST?UCTU?:E
1 . System Levels
Abstraction is a way of avoiding complexity and a
mental tool for approaching complex problems [Lij^stra 2)].
The use of abstartion allows the presentation of a system
design that is concise, precise, and easy to understand.
There are four levels of abstraction for the F35 as
presented in figure 3.
Level C* is the hardware level aM consists of the
ZF021 microprocessor memory and some form of disc storage
(initial implementation may be with floppy disc).
Level 1, the Kernel, is isolated and protected from
manipulation r accidential or malicious) by bei^g placed in
the more privileged domain of the ZS031. Only the Kernel has
access to "system" machine instructions and controls all
access to the system hardware elements ''memory, disc). The
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Level 2, the Supervisor, operates in the outer 'less
privileged ) domain of the Z8?01. It has access to "normal"
machine instructions, but must go through the software
Gatekeeper [Coleman! of the Kernel to get access to memory
(viz., segments) and iisc storage. The Supervisor provides a
virtual file hierarchy to each Host system for file storage.
In order to manage the file hierarchy, surrogate processes
(input /output (10) and file management (FM)) are assigned tc
each TJ ost system. These processes act on the reauests
submitted by the Host computer systems. *11 processes are
created at system generation time and are not created or
deleted in a dynamic manner.
Level 3 consists of the Post computer systems. These
systems a~e hardwired tc the Z8001 in the FSS design. Each
port has a fixed access level so that if a multilevel secure
Host desires to handle data at two levels, it must have two
connections to the ^SS. 'Note that if the Host is not a true
secure multilevel Host, and dees have multiple connections




2 . System Protocol
Protocols are formal specifications which constrain
data exchange between systems and the PSS. These
specification? allow the FSS to achieve bounded, deadlock
free and fault tolerant communication. To organize and
26

simplify protocol design in the FSS , protocol is logically
divided into a hierarchical structure of two interacting
layers. Level 1 protocol handles packet (described later)
synchronization, error detection, and command type
determination. Level 2 handles the repetitive activity of
data transfer.
Data and commands are transmitted between ^SS and
lost via fired sire packets. Packet synchronization is
necessary for Host-r SS communication. Error
letection/correction is closely related to the problem of
packet synchronization; packets not in synchronization will
not he correct. The converse is not true, however, k
synchronized packet may contain transmission errors. There
are several methods f n r error detection/correction
[Hamming]. A design choice of a simple check sum per packet
'to detect packet errors) was made in the interest of Svstem
simplicity. If an error is detected in a packet, the Host
will be reauested to stop packet transmission and to be^ir
a^ain with the packet in which the error was detected. Cf
course, the FSS must be able to orovide the same service.
This retransmission upon error detection strategy, combined
with the byte narity checks performed at the hardware level
by the UART, will provide the error detection/correction
scheme in the initial FSS design.
3. Host Environment
The job of the FSS is to nrovide a service, viz., to

store files in a secure data warehouse . The files are
submitted by various Host computer systems. The virtual
environment provided the Host systems is therefore a primary
design consideration of the overall FSS design. Design soals
are to make this Host environment simple, easy to use and
understand, efficient and robus t .
The center of the Host environment is the
hierarchical file structure maintained by the Supervisor of
the FSS. This file structure is a tree organization which
facilitates design abstraction (virtual file systems per
Host) as well as file system searches via tree traversal.
Figure 4 illustrates the overall logical structure of the
Supervisor file system.
A file can be defined, in the case of the FSS, as
one or more Supervisor segments grouped tosether for the
purpose of access control ''security), retrieval (read), ari
modification (write) [Shaw]. In the FSS the file is the
basic unit of storage at the Host system level.
The hierarchical file system contains two types of
files: 1) data files, and 2) directory files. Beth file
types are constructed from segments 'invisible to the Host
systems) at the Supervisor level. The characteristics
usually associated with a segmented environment (Supervisor
level) such as data sharing and access control, are
transferred to the file environment (Host level) by the FSS.
The Host system environment consists of a virtual
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Figure 4. General Supervisor File Hierarchy Example
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virtual file system per hardware port). A primary reason for
having multiple virtual file hierarchies is to avoid the
problem of naming conficts which would eventually occur in
the Supervisor hierarchy as the system .grew if per-host
virtual file systems did not exist. Multiple directories
also allow the Host systems to group related files into one
directory, simplifying search and Eost use. The Supervisor
will control the duplication problem within a virtual file
system by not allowing dvnlicate file names in a single
directory file. Pathnames are required to uniquely identify
files in the Supervisor file systems and must be included in
the Host reauest
.
Access to the Supervisor file hierarchy is
controlled in both a discretionary and non-discretionary
mar.rer. The non-di scret icrary access is controlled by the
Kernel which will prevent a Host system from reading up or
writing down (confinement property). Discretionary access to
the files is handled by the Supervisor which compares the
Host. user •'Host use" combination) with the file ACL.
Reauestei access is permitted only if the Host. user is
explicitly permitted access by the file ?.CL.
Tach Host system virtual file hierarchy is
constructed from data files and directory files which, as
mentioned above, are constructed of Supervisor segments.
Although dynamic growth and shrinkage are usual segment
attributes, a design choice for System simplification was
made to fix segment size at three increments, SM4LL (512
30

bytes), MEDIUM (2K bytes), and L*BGY (SI bytes). These sizes
were chosen as a compromise between expected file sizes,
Supervisor buffer retirements, and minimizins the number of
software ring crossings that would be required during a data
file 'read' or 'store' operation. Pecause se^^ent size is
limited and there exists the likelihood of encountering
files larger than the maximum segment size, the concept of a
multiple segment file (msf) is known to the Supervisor.
Figure 5 denicts the general tree structure of a
Supervisor virtual file hierarchy. Directory files are
represented by sauares and data files by circles. Data
files, as their name implies, contain data only. Directory
files are constructed of a header and zero or more
"entries". There are two types of entries, branch entries
and link en t ri es .
Pranch entries contain the attributes of the file
which they identify. In figure 5, for example, the
attributes of directory file User_l 'entry r.ane, fCL, size,
type, etc.) are contained in directory file Hcst_l, branch
entry User_l. One branch entry designates one Supervisor
segmen t
.
» link entry, represented by the dotted line ir
figure 5. is composed of an "entry name" (link name) and a
pathname. ( « pathname is the concatenation of entry names
starting from the root directory and proceeding in
seouential order to the specified file.) Like a branch






















File 1 File 1
'i^jre 5. Virtual 'ile hierarchy (logical view)
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example, in figure 5, the pathname contained in the link
entry is Hos t_I>User_3>Lir_l . Unlike a "branch entry,
however. the link entry does not contain any file
attributes. Access is controlled as tne Supervisor traverses
the specified path to the requested file.
The use of link entries allows sharing of files
among Host systems ana" among Host system users. Loops which
might be venerated by two links which reference each other,
are prevented by the Supervisor. (Loons could present a tree
traversal problem to the Suoer visor.)
Each file has a file name (Entry_\'are—uniaue per
directory file) .?iven by the Host system at file creation
time. This file name and its pathname are used to ur.iouely
locate the file in the Host's virtual file system. By
traversing the virtual hierarchy, the Supervisor can locate
the reauested file if it exists in the system. In either
case (viz., whether the file exists or not), appropriate
action can be taken by the Supervisor.
a. Directory File
Figure 6 is e logical representation of a file
directory. "Each directory file is made up of a heade 7* and
zero or rrore fixed size branch/link entries. A fixed
directory size of LP:3G2 (8K bytes) was chosen to insure a
reasonalble amount of directory space for Host system use.
This could rose a "space" problem, especially for secondary











ACL_P f r-2 bytes
Eili Size-4 bytes






E" t ry~Name-lS bytes
Branch_Lirk_Switch-l byte
Lini-128 bytes
Li*<k Created --16 bytes
^iaure 6. Loeical Directory Structure
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buffer space.) The Kernel, which stores segments as pages,
lay want to 'compact' segments by not storing or. secondary
storage pases which contain all "zeros". This would, greatly
reduce the amount of wasted space o n secondary storage.
(Another equally viable solution, but not selected for this
desisn, is to have multiple segment directories in the
Supervisor similar to multiple segment data files.) The
directory file reader contains the following information:
Entry_Count : This is the number of branch/link
entries in the directory.
ACL_Count: This is a count of the number of
i
.CL_I'N'TRY elements left in a "pool" of such elements.
If the entry is a branch entry, it will contain
the following elements:
T,ntry_^!ame: Fntry name is the file name. The
En?t systems a^e responsible for supplying these names but,
as mentioned above, will be prevented by the Supevisor from
havin? duplicate names (file names) in ore directory file.
Access_Class : This element certains the file
access level
.
3ranch_Link_Switch : This element will identify
the entry as a branch ent^y which in turn specifies the
entry format.
ACL_Ptr: This element will poirt to ar ACL for
the branch entry. The 7SS has only three distinct
discretionary access modes: 1) "null" access as the name
implies, declares that no access is to be allowed to the
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specified Host. user combination, 2) "read" access allows a
Qualified Host. user to read a file only (i.e., no write
access), 3) "write" access allows a Host. user write access
to a file (also implicit read access). The actual ACL will
be a list cf authorized users ir the form Host. user with ar
associated access mode. A 'don't care' authorization (in
this case a *) , will allow general access in that category.
^or example, *.user would allow the specified 'user' to
access this file fro^ any connected Host system with a
specified access mode. This ACL for entry "user" can easily
be expanded to include other categories such as 'pro/j o ct" to
further refine the discretionary access allowed to a file.
File_Size: This information is n or- essary for
nroper management of the Host HiAI_JILI and STCR1!_FILE
commands by the Supervisor, viz.. it allows the Supervise 1"
to calculate the number of segments that ma.-ce uo a multiple
segment file. It will be supplied by the Host system in the
STCRS_FIL3 command reouest -in bits).
Data_Bir_Switcr ; This switch tells the
Supervisor the type of file to which the branch points
'data, directory). This is necessary due to the different
file formats.
?i le_Crea ted : This ele^ert is used for general
audit purposes, i.e., to have a permanent record cf the file
creator and the ti m e of creatior.
Last_Undater This element will identify the last
Host a^id user to store into the file. This identification
?p

will be of the fori- Hos t .us n r .da te. time . This will allow the
FSS to have a limited audit capability. The confinement
property prevents the FS5 frcn also keeping track of read
accesses since processes at higher levels can read at lower-
levels hut cannot write + he audit information, ftlso note,
that the Last_Update information for upgraded directories
nay rot he accurate for the sa-^p reason.
If the entry is a link entry, it contains only
four elements. These are: 1) Entry_:Mame to identify the
file, 2) ?ranch_Link_Swi tch to identify the entry type, 3)
Link, a pathname to uniquely identify a file, an.3 4)
f, reate_Time , the time of link initiation alon^ with the
Host. user who crea f ed the link. All attribute checking is
done as the Supervisor traverses the specified path.
A FSS design choice is to limit all pathlengths
to 125 bytes. This places some restrictions on the "est in
that lor,?; file names will soon consume the bytes available
for a pathname. r Dwever, this restriction can be overcome by
pathnames which contain several link entries, which can
themselves be 128 bytes, '.v'ith 32 branch/link entries per
directory, there are an average of 32 ACL entries (3 bytes
each) available to each branch entry. ( Remember ,lirk entries
do not have ACL entries.) Figure 5 contains the initial
field sizes for the directory construction. The primary
factor in calculating the size of branch/link entries is the
size of the link pathname. This increase c the size of link
entries to 163 bytes and althoush snace is wasteo in branch
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entries, the simplif icat ior. of System design resulting f r om
a fixed size of branch/link er.try is felt to be sufficient
justification in the initial design.
t. Tata v iles
Data files are always "leaf" nodes in the file
hierarchy ar.d contain only data.
c. Multiple Segment File Directory
A msf directory is a Supervisor construct
(invisible to Host systems') to manage files larger than the
maximum, fixed segment size. Because the number jf segments
that will he reauired by the Supervisor to store a file car-
te calculated from the file size information passed by the
Host, a msf directory need orly be a segment of size zero.
This makes the Kernel alias table (which is a fixed
size— see [Colemanl ) the limiting factor in the maximum file
size. The alias table has the same number of entries as a
Supervisor directory (viz., 32) which limits maximum Host
file size to 256K bytes. Tiles that exceed the ma^i-num file
size must be split by the Host system. ,Sti attempt tn store a
file that is 'too' large will result is an error condition
response to the Host and an unexecuted command.
4 . Host System Commands
The Host commands Drovide the only interface that a
Host system has with the TSS. Each command is interpreted by
3P

the FS3 and acted upon by surrogate Supervisor processes?
the u ost system has no direct access to the FSS. There is
one acknowledgement "between the Host and 735 at this level.
This is a "command complete" acknowledgement that informs
the Eost system that the Supervisor has completed action on
its reauest. If an error condition occurs, the appropriate
error cede is returned in the acknowledgement.
Another aspect of the Host environment needs to be
defined also. The Host environment can be divided into two
states? they are the "oil" state, before the FSS has acted
upon the Host reauest, and the "new" state, which occurs
after action has been completed by the FSS. The specific
sta + e of the FSS at any instant is indeterminate at the Host
level if more than one n ost is accessing the same file of
the FSS at o^e tine. That is, since Supervisor processes
execute in a completely asynchronous manner, the TSS state
may change after a Host command is sent but before the FSS
acts en tne command. This will not affect the oerformence of
the System or validity of its security? Host commands will
be executed as a single, atomic operation in the FSS state
in which they are received and interpreted. The Host will
get some "correct" response for some state existing between
the sending of the Host command and the FSS acitr owledgemer t
on the same command. This allows several Hosts to safely
synchronize their actions external to the FSS.
The follrwir.fr is considered to be a minimal subset
of commands available to the Host System for adecuate file
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control. Figure 7 illustrates the reauired discretionary
access attributes. T^e files are referenced in the Host
Command descriptions starting from the root of the Hcst
virtual file system. The pathname specifies the parent
directory file (containing access attributes of the file),
and the file (data or directory) to which the u cst command
refers. All commands reriuire a pathname for ur.iaue file
identification. Fach command also reauires tne specification
of the Host system "user" in order for the Supervisor to
nerform discretionary security checks. This 'userid" will be
supplied by the Host system or the Host, system user, which
ever is appropriate.
CR2ATE_FILE <pathname, access_class , file_type
'directory, data)>. This command reauests that the
Supervisor create a branch entry in the specified directory
under the specified file name at the specified access class.
Ar initial access mode of write will be .fiven to file
creator and nnay be altered by the use of the £DD_ACL_ENTRY
and DELETE_ACl_ENTRY commands. This is the only Host cormand
where file access class is specified. It is used ir. this
command to create upgraded directory files, if desired.
(Data files may not be ungraded
—
described later.) In the
initial implementation (with single level Hosts), there will
be no ungraded directories within a Host virtual file
system. Initial data file size is zero? initial directory
file size is LARTF (s=k bytes). Actions taken:
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file system for this Host arl does a tree traversal to
locate the parent directory file.
2) If the parent directory file is not found or
found but write access to the parent directory file is not
allowed, ar appropriate error code is returned ''"file not
found' or 'write rot permitted'^.
3) If the directory file is found, and room exists
in the directory, the new file is entered in a t^-anch. As
mentioned above, re duplicate file names will be allowed by
the Supervisor.
CRSAr'?_LI KJK ^pathname, link ,userid>. This command
reauests that the Supervisor create a link in the specified
directory under the specified file name. As already
mentioned, the Supervisor will not allow links to form
loops. This is done by restricting the maximum number of
files in one pathname to 64 files. (This figure is reached
by allowing a maximum pathlength of 122 bytes and having
file names of ore character. File name delimiters of one
character, viz. ">", will £ive a maximum pathlensth of 64
files.) 3y keepir..? track of the path traversed, the
Supervisor is able to determine if and when a loop is
formed. Actions taken:
1) The Supervisor locates the root of the virtual
file system for this Host and does a tnee traversal to
locate the parent directory file.
2) If the parent directory file is not found or
found but write access to the parent directory file is not
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allowed, an appropriate error code is returned.
3) If the parent directory file is fou n.d and room
exists in the directory, the link is entered in a link
entry .
DELETS_FILF Pathname ,userid>. This command
reauests that the Supervisor delete the specified file from
the virtual file hierarchy, ^or design simplicity, only
terminal files (including msf's), can he deleted. This meais
that directories must be empty in order to he deleted.
Actions taken:
1) The Supervisor locates the root of the virtual
file system for this Host and does a tree traversal to
locate the parent directory file.
2) If parent directory file is not found or found
hut write access to the parent directory file is not
permitted, an acuropriate error code is returned.
3) Otherwise, if the file is located, it is ?ele + ei
oy the Supervisor.
READ_FILE ^pathname, command_ type ^direct o ry, data,
size) ,userid>. This command reauests that the Supervisor
transmit to the Host either a data file, directory file
^selected elements only), or the File_Size, Last_Update, and
Access_Class ''entry data) elements associated with a
particular file. ?n explanation of the last parameter, to
transmit e^try data only, reeds s^me explanation.
"Branch entry elements can be logically divided into

two categories with respect to discretionary security. The
first category, which includes Tntry_Name,
Branch_Lin>_Svitch, Access_Class , a^d ACL_?tr are branch
entry attributes which cannot be altered by a Host process
unless the process has discretionary write access to the
directory which contains the file branch entry.
The second category, which contains File_5ize and
Last_Update, are attributes which 'belong ' to the file and
must be updated when the file is updated. A situation nay
exist where a uroces? may not have any discretionary access
to a directory but may have discretionary read access to a
file in the directory (nlus implicit access to the rest of
the directory during the "search"). In order to read this
file, the Host system will need to know file size in order
to prepare to receive it. This is the situation where the
?.?SD_?IL1T (size) command is needed. fl ctions taken: (for data
file)
1) The Supervisor locates the root of the virtual
file system for this Host ani does a tree traversal to
locate the desired directory file.
2) If the file is not found or found but read access
to the file is not allowed, an appropriate error message is
returned
.
^) Otherwise, the file is transmitted to the
reouesting Host System.







! If the directory file is found and read access
allowed, selected elements of the branch/lins entries are
returned to the Host.
'for file size)
1) The Supervisor locates the root of the virtual
file system for this Host and does a tree traversal to
locate the desired file.
2) If the file is not found or found but read access
to the file is not permitted, an appropriate error cede is
returned
.
3) Otherwise, the File_Si->e and Last_Update elements
are returned to the Host.
STCR"5_?ILE <pathname, file_size ,userii>. This
command reauests that the supervisor store the sperified
file in the HSS. Actions taken:
1) The Supervisor locates the root of the virtual
file system for this Host and does a tree traversal tc
locate the data file.
2) If the data file is not found or found cut write
access to the data file not. allowed, an appropriate error
code is returned. Note that Host systems can store only data
files; directories are 'built' by the Supervisor.
3) Otherwise, a store operation is performed by the
FSS.
READ ACL ^pathname ,userid>. This command is used by
4.c

the Host systems in conjunction with the ADD_ S,CL_ENTF.Y and
P'
PITT'?_ACL_ENTHY to adjust (give/rescind) the access mode
(read /write) allowed to a Host /Host user to a specific file.
Actions taken:
1) The Supervisor locates the the root cf the
virtual file system for this Post and does a tree traversal
to locate the parent directory file.
2) If the file is rot found or is found tut read
access is net allowed to the parent directory file, an
appropriate error code is returned.
3) Otherwise, the supervisor returns the file ACL
for Host system user examination.
ADD_ACl_ENTRY ^ pathname, ACL_Er.try ,userid N-. This
command reauests the Supervisor to add to the specified file
ACL the specified 1 CL_'Entry (Host. user conbir.a tior plus
associated access mode). a s with the orevious commands, the
access is checked for correctness hy both the Supervisor and
the Kernel before any action is taken.
DELETE_ACL_ENTRY ^pathname, 5 CL_2ntry ,userid>. This
command reauests that an ACL_Er; try he deleted from a file
ACL. A^ain, appropriate discretionary and non-discretionary
checks are made before any action is taken by the FSS.
APOF.T. This command reauests the Supervisor to quit
execution of the present conmard ari return the file system
to its original state. There are only certain locations in
the execution of Host commands that the Supervisor is able
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to interupt. If an 4B0F.T command is received after an
operation has teen completed but before the final Host
acknowledgement is sent, the original command completion
will be acknowledged and the abort command will be ignored.
Otherwise, action of the command will be halted a^d the
Supervisor will wait for another Host command. All Host
commands (including &BOB.T) will be explicitly acknowledged
with either a "command complete" message or an appropriate
error code.
C. PROCESS STRUCTURE
There are two Supervisor processes which act on behalf
of each Host system (hardware port). The inpnt/cutput (10)
process and the file manaee-nent (FM) process. The 10 process
is responsible for communication and data transfer (via
packets) between the Supervisor and the Host system. The FM
process is responsible for managing the per-Host virtual
file systems and providing overall FSS control. &.11 Host
commands are interpreted by the FM process! the 10 process
acts in a "slave" mode to the T M process. Acting together,
the FM and 10 processes interpret and execute the file
management reauests of the Eost systems. Kernel primitives
HEAD, »D7ANCE, AWAIT, and TICKET used in conjunction with
eventcounts and seauencer (described later), are used to
synchronize Host surrogate -process execution.
Both the FM and 10 processes call on Kernel primitives
to perform actual seamert manipulation. The normal order in
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which these calls are made is fixed by the Kernel design. To
add a segment to a process memory, the order of kernel calls
is: 1) C-ate^eeper . r'reate_Sesment , 2) Gatekeeper. MakeJEaown,
aM ?) Gatekeeper .Swap_Ir. . To delete a segment from a
urocess memory, the order of Kernel calls is: 1)
gatekeeper. Swap_0ut , 2) Gatekeeper .Terminate , ar.d 3)
Gatekeeper. Delete_Se,?ment . The Supervisor procedures use
these invokation orders.
There are three levels abstraction for a Host
surrogate process. They are: 1) the level at which Host
commands are known. 2) the level at which files are known,
a r d 3^ the level at which Supervisor segments or packets are
,-cnown. These levels of abstraction should be kept in mind
when readies the Fr1 and 10 process descriptions.
A design choice to simplify file system maintenance and
control is to all^v upgrading of or.ly directories (e.t- .,
unclassified to secret). This will eliminate the possibility
of having a secret file in an unclassified iirectorv, a
situation which would prevent up latins of the file branch
data by the secret process siroe writing "down" is rot
allowed. This restriction is not felt to exclude any
significant FSS capabilities and provides for a simplified
implementation .
The modular construction of the FSS enhances System
structure. All data bases, except the files themselves, are
module local. Codp is expected to be written in PLZ/STS
[Snook], which is a hish level uascal-like structured
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iroaramming language. Pecause of the its length, code is
^Located in Appendix C. The code listed in this appendix
aives the interprocess and intermodule control structure of
the FSS.
1. Shared Segment Interactions
Supervisor nrocess execution occurs in a completely
asynchronous manner. When a process is refered to in the
* following discussions, the two Host surrogate processes are
being referenced; these surrogate processes have the same
clearance levels as the Host they represent.
As already mentioned, the task of the FSS is to
provide a service. To he of maximum benefit, this service
should be unambiguous, easy to use, and robust.
The major problem that the FSS must handle for
proper System security is the confinement problem, viz., to
prevent a process from reading a file with a hi=? v er
classification or writing ;i.e., storing or updating) a file
with a lower classification. This .icb is handled entirely by
the Kernel.
Another problem closely related to the confinement
problem which also ir.voles the Supervisor, is the
readers/writers" problem [Courtoisl. Ir> order to preserve
file inte^rety, reading and writing of e shared file cannot
be allowed at the same time. Since a primary objective of
the PSS is to provide for the sharing of files, this problem
will certainly occur and must be handled properly for System

viability.
Both the confinement problem and the readers/writers
problem can be solved in one of two ways. Mutual exclusion,
a mechanise which forces a tire ordering on the execution of
critical regions, forces concurrent processes into a total
order execution sequence. This is counterproductive to the
purpose of a process structure, which inherently allows
concurrent execution of processes.
A second and relatively new method is the use of
eventccurts and sequencer [Reed] to control access to
critical regions. This method preserves the idea of
concurrent processing to a ruch greater extent. Ap
eventcount is a object that keeps count of the number of
events (in the case of the FSS, segment read/writ Q accessps)
that have occured so far in the execution of the System
procedures. These eventcounts are associated with the
Supervisor se?Tent5. They are accessed only via Kernel calls
a^d can be thought of as non-decreasing integer values. Each
Supervisor segment has two eventcount s associated with it,
one to keep track of the read accesses aid one to keep track
of the write accesses.
A Kernel urimitive ADVANCE signals the occurrence of
an event (read/write segment access) associated with a
particular segment eventcount. The value of an eventcount is
the number of ADVICE operations that have been -oerfomed on
it. A process can observe the value of an eventcount by
either n!EAD''Seg_#, E), which returns the value directly, or
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by ?.WA IT ' Seg_# , T , t), which returns when the eventcount
reaches the specific value t.
8 sequencer is also necessary to solve the
Conf inerrent and readers/writers problems. Sore
synchronization Droble^s reauire arbitration 'e.g., two
write accesses to the sape segment)? eve" tcounts al^ne do
not have the ability to discrininate between two events that
happen in an uncontrolled 'i.e., concurrent J manner. A
seauencer, like eventcounts, can be t^ou^ht of as a
non-decreasing integer variable that is initially zero. Each
Supervisor segment has associated with it one sequencer. The
only operation on a seauencer is a Kernel primitive
operation called TICKET fSeg_#, S), which, when applied to a
sequencer, returns a non-negative integer value. (Similar to
getting a ticket and waiting to be served at a ba-ber shop.)
Two uses of TICK^Tf Seg_*.S ) will return two different values
corresponding to the relative 'time" of call.
The segne'-t number associated with these
synchronization primitives informs the Kernel of which
segment is being referenced. The use n f eventcounts and
seauencer can he illustrated by examining the following two
urocedures fread O as not equal). The FSS implements these






abort: w := READ(Seg_#,S ) > 'get reader eventcount!
AWAIT(Seg_#,c7w) J !wait until write corrplete!
'read file ';




ADV?NCE(Seg tf ,S); lincrement reader eventcount!
t != TICKETTSeg_*,T); Iget seauencer!
AWAIT(Seg_*,C, t")i !wait for write to complete!
'read and update file';
»DV *NCF(Seg #, C) J lincrement writer eventcount!
END
The Kernel will enforce the confinement property and
prever* the application of the ADVANCE and TICKET primitives
to segments with an access class less than the Host access
class. Mot to in so, would allow a communication path to he
created cetwee 71 two different access levels. The two
eventcounts a Supervisor sermert, will have associate^ wir.h
it (in the ^ernel^ are a write eventcount, C, and a read
eventcount, S. Each segment will also have a seauencer, T,
associated with it. Eventcounts and seauencer are initially
zero.
These eventcounts and seauencers, with their
associated Kernel primitives, are used by the ESS to oerform
the synchronization functions of "^locV: and Wake up ("Coleman!
,
described in the original Kernel design. Eventcourts and
seauencers provide a clearer picture of the process
interaction as well as explicit control of the
readers /wri ters ' problem. Even more importantly, they
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permit the synchronization between processes of different
access levels. This is essertial in ^rder t<"> permit a hi^h
level Host to read files of a lower level.
Th°re are two groups of Host rpauests. They can be
classified as read reauests (e.s., ?:EA.I5_VI1E, ??.S.D_ACL) and
write requests (e.g., CREATE_FILE, ST0RE_FIL3). These
categories can he further subdivided into read data file,
read directory file and write data file, write directory
file subcategories, ^ach category tyoe must be handled in a
Droper manner by the Supervisor to insure file integrity,
"ach category will be discussed in turn beginning with the
read file category.
There two conditions which might develop over which
a process has r\r control" file update by another process,
and file deletion by another process. a n example of file
update might occur while a secre* pt-oc°ss is traversing a
file hierarchy and is in the middle of search-ins the
directory for a" Ent^y_Nam c' when another process (at the
directory access level") updates the directory. Since the
secret process will READ the segment "reader" eventcount, S,
before and after the search, it will know that the data it
had obtained is possibly invalid. Although there does rot
aDpear to be a problem with allowing the 'reaiin?' process
j&n re-read the directory file until a "good" read is
achieved, a closer examination of this condition should be
made at implementation time, viz., is it possible for a
'writing' nrocess to alter the pathname of a 'reading'

process so that an inconsistant state is achieved for th a
reading process? a possible solution could reouire a process
which suffers a "had" read to begin the traversal over, !
beginning at the root directory.
When a directory is being read to pass directory
data back to a Eost, the directory data is nut in a buffer
and sent from there.
?. single segment buffer nay bp to s^all to hold a
data file 'e.g., maximum file size of 256K bytes).
Therefore, to present the Host with only ^alid data, a data
file "buffer" is needed at the process level. Since this
buffer will be at the process access level, it can be locked
by the process to insure that no other process interfers
during the reading operation or.ce the data file is ir the
buffer file. This copying of the data file is lone by the FM
process and the 10 process will read t^e file from the
buffer file when transfering the file to a Host system. The
choice of Taking a cory of a data file is awkward but
considered necessary in order to provide the Host with only
atomic operations, i.e., to prevent the situation fro^
occuring where half of a ten segment msf is transmitted to
the Host and the file is either updated or deleted.
The other condition which may arise during a file
read is a file deletion. This situation occurs when one
process is reading a file and another process deletes the
sa^e file. The first procpss, rot knowing that the file
| segment) has been deleted, will try to reference the file

again. A hardware segment fault will occur and cause a
transfer of control to the Kernel. Note that in this
situation, it is the higher access class process which will
suffer the fault while it is reading a lower scress class
file. To handle this problem, viz., the Supervisor segment
fault, a fault handler must he part of the distributed
Supervisor. A Kernel primitive also ree^s defiri r g. This
primitive, Gatekeeper. On_?ault (?ault_cor.dition, Sntry_pt),
is called in the initialization of the Supervisor process
where it is possible for a segment fault to occur. A call to
a Superivsor condition establisher is also necessary. This
will nlace a specific condition handler on a 'condition
stack:". If a fault occurs, the Kernel returns to the
Supervisor fault handle^ with a 'segment fault' error
condition. This fault handler in turn transfers control to
the condition handler at the top of the 'condition stack'
which can nake a normal return from all procedures, '.'/hen the
error condition is detected ''from the return code) by the
appropriate Supervisor level, action is taken, viz., the
Host command in re-initiated. Sirce the file ( segment ( s)
)
has been deleted, this reinvocation may well r a sult in a
'segment not found' error condition being returned from the
Kernel and a "file not found" error condition being relayed
to the Host. When the Supervisor e^its the "sesment fault" a
''revert" command is necessary to remove the condition
handler from the condition stack.
Another side benefit of bavins the Supervisor do all
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the actual file reading (ard therefore take all the segment
faults) is that it prevents a hardware fault from occuring
during the actual data transfer in the Kernel during 10
process execution? this condition would force the handling
of the fault in the Kernel domain— a difficult tas^.
Writing a file is a more straight fore w ari task: ard
presents fewer problems. This is because a writing process
has the sane access class as the file ard ca r prever 1" all
other access to the file (segment! s) ) it is concerned with.
To alter a directory ( C?.EATT_FIL2, DFL2TE_FIL2 . etc.), a
orocess will <?et a ticket to the directory and perform the
necessary manipulation when its number is called. In ^rder
to store a file, more care must "be taken. If a process were
allowed to store directly into the old file, the possibility
exists that a software or hardware error might result in a
partially updated file and loss of file integrity. To
prevent this from occurring, a data file is first store!
ir.tc a temporary ^ile set up by the FM process. This also
,
allows the original file to continue to te read by otner
processes while the store operation is g^ing en, a
significant advantage if the data file is long. *fter the
file is stored by the 10 process, the FM process gets a
ticket to the file directory and when its turn comes, makes
the necessary directory updates, viz., the temporary file
name is subsituted for the old file 7ntry_\'ame, Last_'Jpdate
information charred, and the old file deleted. (If the file
is a msf, each segment is, of course, deleted.)
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2. File Ma^a^ement Process
The T ": process is composed of the five modules
depicted is figure. 5 .(with associated Kernel calls). The FM
process is the controller of the FSS and directs all
interaction between the FSS an-d a Host system. Each nodule
which makes up this process will be described alon<? with the
procedures which Hake up the individual modules.
a. File Management Command Handler Module
ks depicted i^. figure 3, the tr Command Handler
module see Appendix C, p. 134) is at the top of the FM
process hierarchy. This is the level of abstraction at which
Host commands are "known". This module is responsible for
interprocess communication and synchronization (with the 10
process) and Host command interpretation. Interprocess
communication is achieved by the Kernel primitives TICKET,
ADVANCE and AWAIT which act en an eventcount associated with
the shared mail_box ses-^e^t. 1? i?i;re 9 shows the logical
construction ard + h° da'a base description of the mail_bcx.
"^i^ure l* is a list of the procedures contained within the
EM_Command_Handler module and their input and output
parameters.
The FM_Cmd_Hnd procedure is the entry procedure
irto the FM_Command_Eandler module. This is toe control
procedure of the module and is responsible for routing Host
commands to specific EM_Command_Har.dler procedures for
action, '."'hen notified by the 10 process that a command
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Figure ?. Process Modules
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Procedure Input /Output parameters
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packet is ir the mail_box, the FM process retrieves the
command and begins appropriate action. The "est command
le.s., STORE_FILE, XEAr_FILF) is actually an entry into a
case statement which directs the correct FM_Comrnand_ T-iandler
procedure to f ake action. Each Host command has associated
with it, at this level, its own procedure.
Because the procedures of the nodule are
relatively straight forward, they will not he discussed ir.
detail, "he ^e^eral functions of all the procedures ir this
•nodule are to pass instructions to the 10 process and to the
Direct o T, y_Co r, tT'^i module, the workhorse of the FM process.
Some explanation of Host command ua^ameters is






access 1 p ir e 1
u s e r i d
.ACL entry.
In all h^st commands, the pathname passed by the
Host is the pathname (relative to the 'root' directory of
the Host virtual file system) of the file of interest,
whether a directory or data file, ^rom the pathname, the FM
process is able to extract the pathname of the parent
directory which it must brina into the FM process memory to
PA

ched' for proper discretionary access. The complete
Pathname, in terms of the r 3S file system, is passed to the
t)irectcry_Control module for actual directory manipulation.
s pathname and file size 'for the 'tuffer file') is returned
fdir_pat hname, dir_f ile_si ze ) ty the Directory_Control
module during a *J ost RF J D_FIL? cr STORE^H F reauest. This
new pathname a^ file size is passed to the 10 process where
the actual data transfer takes place for these operations.
Since discretionary security checks are made in the FM
process and all input/output "t-uffers" (e.g., temporary data
file, rnail_h n '»' segment) are under positive FM process
control, the TO orocess need not he concerned with
discretionary security or the possibility of a "serm c nt
fault '
.
A link is a pathname which a Host passes in the
b?.E»TE_LINS command.
File type is used for the CRF.4TF_FILF Host
command ard is necessary hecause of the different file
formats .
Command type is used in the ?.FAr_?ILE Host
command to specify the type of 'read' the F5S is to conduct,
i.e., to read a directory file, a data file, or only a data
file size
.
File size is passed hy t^.e Host during
STC?.E_FIL2 reouests. This information is necessary :"or the
Fr" process tc create a temporary file of sufficient size to
store a Host file. File size is relayed to the 10 orocess so
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that the 10 process can ^o directly to the lata file without
jjaving to chpc^ f he directory file for file size. File size
is in ci ts .
Access level is "e p,ie- for the CHEAT 3 FILE
command. This allows for upgraded directories ^remember,
iata files cannot he upgraded).
The identification of the Host system user is
necessary for the FSS to perform discretionary security
checks. This is provided by the Host system through the
userid paramet er .
ACLj5>try i 5 use ^ w i t h the •' DD_ ! CL_SNTEY and
foViTrrnvji CL_ENTRY commands to sive/rescind discretionary
access + o f i les .
b. Directory Control Module
The Directory_Control module, as the na'ne
implies, ices the directory manipulation and maintenance.
Figure 11 lis*; the procedures which 'vnKe up this module
along with their input/output parameters.
This i c f he level of the I'M process at which
files are known. The Directory_Con tori module handles tne
J
readers/writers problem with the appropriate use of the
kernel syncroni zation primitives READ, ADVANCE. A'* A IT, and
TICKET. It handles the sesmert fault condition by a call to
the condition establisher when the possibility of a segment
fault exists. The 10 process uses the same primitives while


































operations, viz., the tree traversal when locating the date
file read buffer or the temporary storage file. £s
previously Te^ti^ne^, the IC process will not face the
orohle^ of file deletion while reading and will therefore
not have to establish a condition handler.
Logically, rj ost reauests reauire four basic
actiors to he pprf nr^ori at this level. They are: 1) to bring
a directory file into "Process memory for a read and/or write
ooeration, 2) to delete a file, 3 ) to create a file, or 4)
to copy a data file into a data file buffer. 4 11 other file
Tiairte T"a r ce fur^tio^s such as managing memory or managing
the limited number of segments available to a process, ar P
performed by subordinated modules. There are three
procedures in this module.
The Bir_Cntrl Directory procedure is the
Di rec t ory_C o^ + r*"1 1 module procedure which handles Host
commands which reouire tha + the oarent directory he broueht
into process memory in order that reauired discretionary




HEAT_EIL T (dir, size)
ADD„ACL_ENTRY
T)TT-p.TE_*CL_ENT?.Y.
To uerform these tasks, the parent directory
65

segment (which contains the file branch/link entry) must b<
b r o u £ b. t into nro^ess n^norv to c h e c ,-r or iro^er
discretionary access. If access is permitted, the
oesrner. t_ Handler module is called with a pathname of a
segment reauired to be brought into process memeory.
For action or a DEL3T]C_TI1E command,
discretionary write access to the directory is reauired
since the branch/link entry of the file must be removed fro^
the directory when the file is deleted. (Note that this
raises the possibility of a Host having write access to a
file hut not able to delete it because he does not have
write access to the directory.; If the parent directory file
is not found or found but write access to the directory rot
permitted an appropriate error code is returned, viz., "file
rot found nr write access not permitted
If an error condition does not arise, the
directory is brought into process memory ard a cheo> of the
file attributes is Tale to determine file type (data,
directory, link). Tf it is a data file or link entry, it car
be deleted because it is a terminal node in the fil Q
hierarchv. If it is a directory, the (directory) file itself
must be brought into process memory to see if the directory
is empty 'viz., check of Tntry_Count and presence of a
Supervisor temporary file':. If it is not empty, an error
code of "not terminal file" is returned to the Host. If the
directory is empty, it can be deleted.
If r o error condition occurs during the

preceding checks, the file ^ay (subject to check by the
Kernel) be deleted. The Dir_Cr.trl_Directory procedure will
call on Se2_"nd_ ,v|ake_Unaidres5able procedure which will in
turn call !v!em_H*i ^_Swapcut orocedure to remove the segment
from process memory if it is in memory. r ?.emenber the actual
order: Swap_Ou*, Terminate, Delete.) Mert , the Kernel
primitive, GateKeeper .Delet e_Segmen t is called to delete the
file fron the 735. Hnte that in the case of ^s^'s, th c se
steps must be repeated until all segments of the file are
deleted. At this time, the branch entry is removed from the
directory by zeroina all branch entry elements 'to allow for
Kernel secondary ?tora?e corpacticr of disc pa^es of zeros).
The 10 process is then instructed to acknowledge the Host
with "file deleted". This frees the entry for future use.
The deletion of link requires the same
discretionary wri tQ access + o the directory. In this case,
no further checks are necessary and the link entry elements
are zeroed in thp directory, freeing the entry for re -use.
"or the "R^'TF^IL^ command, analogous action is
take" by the Dir_Cr.t,rl_Di rect ory procedure, viz., to check
discretionary write access to the directory which will
contain the file branch entry.
Once this check has been satisfactorily
completed, a'-d ro n p ^Tists in the directory, the Kernel call
Gatekeeper
. Create_Se2ment is made to create the file. The
initial file size is zero for data files since the
Supervisor has no prior knowleds-e of the size of the file
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trat will be stored ir the branch entry. As explained




The C?.EATE_LINK reauest is again analogous, the
only difference being that instead of a branch entry bein?
~?ade ir the directory, a lirk entry is *^aie. .^s previously
mentioned, the Supervisor will not allow a loon state.
Checks will *»*t be made at, link creatior time? however, the
Supervisor will 'abort' a file search if it encounters this
error condition d u r i
n
s tre° traversal.
The R r' 5 *,| _'Ir IL r Mir; command reauires read access
t r a directory file. If no er r,i r condition arises during
discretionary security checks, selected directory data
'e.g., Entry_Name, ?ile_Siz^, etc.} is transfered to the
Host system via the mail_box segment (viz.,
Dir_Cata_3uf fer ) . This selected directory data for each
'occupied' branch/link entry is transfered during the
t~AD_YILT dir) command. Tor the :1E^_ !_?IL" (size) reauest,
only selected directory data for a specific data file is
transfered. The IC and FM orocesses use appropriate Kernel
synchronization primitives to assure that the information in
the mail_box segment is valid.
The last thr^e Host reouests handled by the
Dir_C!ntrl_Direct ory procedure are related. Again,
appropriate discretionary access checks must be ^ade in the
parent directory. If no error condition arises, the action
take'1 is straight foreward. Ir the case of the ?.E'D "CL
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command, the file 4 CI is transferee! tc the nail_to:<:
3,CL_buffer aM the procdure returns to the
fM_Command_?andler module. In the case of the
ADD(DELTri N _ACL_ZNTRY co^mar.d s . the actior. is completed by
the Dir_Cntrl_Directory procedure and the appropriate
Di r_Succ_Code returned
.
The T, i^_Cr.trl_"ata procedure is responsible for
trar sf erir.g to/from a Host a reouested data file if
necessary preconditions are met 'viz., discretionary and
r.on-discret i onary security). Ir order to read c^ store a
file, a Host must have the proper discretionary access to
the file. To check this, the parent iirectory which contains
the file branch entry must he broueht into memory. This is
done by the Ses^e^t Handler module. If the proper access is
rot allowed, a" error code is returned to the
EM_Commar.d_Kardl p,~ module for relay to the Host system. If
the proper access is allowed, a cooy of the file is made in
the case n f the ?. E
.
a D J? I L E command, or a temporary file is
created in the case of the STCR?_"R'ILE command. The pathname
and file size of the data ^iles to be transferee are passed
to the 10 process which will perform the actual data
transfer. Upon a successful transmission of the data by the
10 process, tbe VM
. nrocess instructs the 10 process to
acknowledge the Host with a "read complete" or "store
complete', as apurouria te
.
The Eir_Cnt rl_Data procedure will make
appropriate use of kernel synchronization primitives {e.s.,
«Q

&WAIT, R 7 .a D, etc.) when copying- a lata file into the data
file read buffer "t setting1 up a temporary file for the
store operation. After the file transfer has ta>er. ulace in
the 10 process, the IC process returns a success code to the
T process. The 10 process will return to the F M process
vher one of three conditions e v ist : 1) p ither the real or
store operation is successful and complete, or 2} a command
packet is T'ecei l^a ', (viz., a*1 abort command), or 3) a
'time-cut' occurs and the 10 process was not able to
complete the command
.
7 or a store operation, the Dir_Cntrl_Update
procedure is "ailed to update the directory data (viz.,
exchange the temporary file ?ntry_Name with the old file
Entry_Name) and deletes the old file. (The temporary file
should be deleted by this procedure if, upon attempting to
update the file, the old file cannot be found.)
Since eacln directory segment has only one
temporary file for file update, s^ m e delay may be
experienced by ^ost systems if several try to store lar-sre
files into the sa-^e directory. This does r ot appear to be a
major problem since most users are anticipated to be
operatirg fro^ their own directory files.
The *Hr_nntrl_Update procedure is also used to
free the temporary storage file in the case of a Host abort
command
.
c. Discretionary Security Module
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The T, iscretior.ary_Security module is responsible
for checking Eost user discretionary access to a specific
file and adding and deleting .4CL_entries . '-11 file «CL's are
logically located in this nodule. This is the only other
nodule besides the direct or.y_Co n t rol "nodule where a segment
fault ni r-h f. n^cn-*. Appropriate us a cf the condition
establisher must he made before any attempt to read an ACL
sr that a pr^p^r return is executed to the Directory_Cor.trol
module in the event of a fault. There are four procedures
vhich make up this nodule a=» depicted in figure 12.
The Di sc_Sec_ r'hec.<_ 5 cce ss procedure, as the name
implies, checks f A r a specific user discretionary access to
a specific file. a success cole returns, indicating the
result of the check. This discretionary check is only made
on the specific file which is reouired in a Host command,
i.e., a design choice was made not to make discretionary
access checks during the tree traversal search for the
specified file. This mates explicit in one ACL who has
access to a file, which contributes to clear security
semantics. (This also eliminated the Question of what to do
if an intermediate directory was encountered during a file
search to which the process did not have read access.)
T'^e Piso_Se^_'5 dd_'CL_;Lnt ry procedure adds an
ACL_entry to a file ACL and returns a success code to
indicate the action taken. 2 s noted previously, a directory
has a limited number of ACL_entry elements. The Supervisor




Disc_Sec_ ACL Disc_Succ_coi e
Check_Access ftCLJSntry




Disr_Ser_ aCL Pi sc_Succ_C ode
Eelete_AGL_Sntry ACL_Entry
Userid
Disc_Sec A.CL_Er: t^y Disc_Succ_Code
Set Pntry Userid
Figure IP. Piscre ti onary_Securi ty Module
Procedure In put /Out put Parameters
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the fila creator). If another ACI_entry 15 reauired and t.ne
&CL_entry "nocl" is empty, an "CL_ertry element will have to
he explicitly freed from a file ty the Host before a file
?CL can he added to.
The r'isc_Sec_"1 elete_ 5 ^L
_
r
'n t ry procedure performs
the straight foreward task cf deleting an 1 CL_entrv fron a
file ACL. This prociure returns a success code when deletion
is complete .
The last procedure of this module is the
Disc_Sec_Get_?CI pT~edur°. It is used during the intial
creation of a file ty the Direct ory_ "on trol nodule to get an
i r it.ial ACL Entry element.
d. Segment "andler Module
The Segment _Eandler module is the abstraction
level at which Supervisor segments are known. This module
works in conjunction with the r/ emo r, y_Handler module
'described later) to either bring a segment into process
memory (viz., Ma^e Known, S i > ,ap_Ir) or to terminate a segment
(viz., Swap_0ut, Terminate). This module is responsible for
maintaining fhe FM_KST (known segment table—figur° 13) data
base. The data base elements of the FM_KST are the pathname
of a segment known to the process, the segment number
'See_£' of the terminal file in this pathname, -rode (i.e.,
reed or '> r r i t e 1 , and the use bit necessary fen a LVJ r^^oval
algorithm ( approximation ) . Tn prevent the situation where a
segment has be " deleted by one process tut is still
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Se,?_ CI nd_ Pathname
Make Unadd ressahle
Ses Succ Code
Figure 14. Segment _?andler Module
Procedure Input /Output Parameters
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indicated as i*1 rre n"C T>7 by another process, each new Host
command will initiate a v ernel call, Gatekeeper
.
Swap_In
(Ses_#, Base_ c ddr), to confirm the existence of a segment. i!
Kernel return o f "segnp^t not found' will indicate that the
segment has been deleted. The "SS must then clear its data
structures o ? invalid data and traverse the virtual
hierarchy fro^ the root directory to insure that the segment
is truely gone and that it has not teen rename! by another
process i.e., + ^ cover the unlikely situation where a
pathname has "been deleted and then re-created with the same
filenames. This would associate differe r t segment numbers
with the same pathname.
Figurp 14 is a list of the procdur°s of this
module along with their input/output parameters. This module
receives a file segment oa^hname and returns when it has
been brought into p-ocess memory or an error condition
arises. The possible er'^r condition that might be returned
from this module is 'file rot found'. This module has two
tasks, and therefore two procedures. To make a segment
addressable by the ~ost process (viz., brins it into process
memory) or to make a segment unaddressable by a Host process
'viz., to remove the segment from process memory). The
procedures which handle these tasks are the
Seg_Hni_ v,ake_Aidressable 'i.e., bring a segment into process
memory' a-.* 5e?_H r, d_Make_Unaddres sable (i.e., remove a
segment from process memory) procedures. ' <lote that to ma^e
a segment addressable also reo^ires making the segment
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Known and that makir.a a segment unaiiressable reauires
"terminating" the ser^e^t. ') 3oth tasks are accomplished by
apnronria te use of Kernel primitives and accompanied by
calls to the f/, e rri "ry_Ha Ti il er module to Swap_In or Swap_0ut a
segment
.
This nodule is also responsible for segment
management. Segment management is necessary because each WMU
allows the add^pssi*1 ,? of only 64 s e ^ e *! t s . With ore MMU ir
the initial TSS implementation and several segments taken by
the Supervisor a 1"^ Kerne] segments, the number available to
the Supervisor orocesses will be somewhat less
»'i^X_KNO'»N_Sr:':-
,
> thai 64. This number must be managed ir a
dynamic manner without interfering with process execution.
The Se^_::rd_Mak Q_Addres sa hie procedu T,a is the
more involved of the two module procedures. If a reauest to
make a segment kr.^vr is received , the FM K5T is checked to
see if it is already known. If it is, the LRU bit is set and
the Memory _Har.d ler module is called to assure that the
segment is in orocess memory. If it is not already known to
the process, it must be made known by the Kernel call,
Gatekeeper. Make_Known (Par_seg_^, entry_#, mode). But this
can only be done if process segment limit is not exceeded.
If the addition of a segment will cause an overflow, a
seg~ert must be removed by the 3e?_Hrd _Nade_Unaidressable
procedure. Once this is done, the desired' segment can be
rrade known, the FM_KST updated, and the Memory Handler
module called to bring it i"to process memory.
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The S*3 g_Hnd_,v!ake_jna''dressable procedure is
straight foreward. This procedure may be called to either
delete a specific segment or to delete the LRU segment. If
called to remove a specific segment, actio r is taker, to
remove the segment (described below). If callei to remove
the LRU segment, a LPU removal algorithm 'approximation) is
used to determine which segment will be removed J '.'.'hen this
has been done, the Memory_Randler module is called to
Swap_Cut the segment fro^ process memory. A returned success
code indicates that the segment has been removed by the
Kernel call 3-atekeeper . Swap_Cut (Seg_#). A call is then made
to termirate the selected segment. The Kernel call,
Ga t ekeeper . Ter^i^a t, e (Par S^g -, Tntry K ti ) , will cause the
segment to be deleted from the Kernel K3T. Removing the
Segment pathname from the TM_KST will complete the action
taken by this procedure.
o
# ['p^iiry Har^lP T" Module
This module operates in a "slave" mode to the
Begment_Eardler module and consist of two procedures. These
procedures are listed in figure 15 along with their
input /output parameters. The job of this module is to
dynamically manage a fixed size linear virtual memory. It
does this by swapDin? in and out of process memory segments
as reauired
.
When the Mem_End_Swap_In procedure is called,









Men_End_.Swap_Out Sep_* Me m Succ Cole
Figure 15. Memory_Randler Module
Procedure I", put /Cut put Parameters
Se*j_* Size Base_Addr Use
Figure 16. ?M *ST
(7 1 2 . . . Base_*ddr
SEG_#
Fisure I 7 . Mem_Map
73

see if i + is already in memory. If it is, its LRU bit is set
and Gatekeeper .Swap_In 'Ses_#, lase_°ddr) is called tc
insure that the sp^^e^t has not been delete! fcy another
nrocess since last use. If the segment is not in ne^ory, the
M"5!M_MAP data structure, figure 17, is checked to find rocn
for a se^m<=r.t of the reauired size, ftrguemerts car "be made
for both a first-fit aid best-fit. memory management scheme
[Shaw], i first-fit scheme is chosen for the K3S due to the
simpler implprrenation and + he reduced memory fragmentation.
If room cannot be found, Mem_Hnd_Swap_0'Ut is called
iterative! 1/ until enough roc 1^ erist for the segment to be
brought into process memory. ? Kernel call,
Ga tekeeper .Swapi" {Sep_~, 3ase_Addr), is used tc move the
segment into crocess memory when room exists.
^em_Hnd_Swap_Cut may either be called to remove
a specific segment or to remove the LP.U segment from Droc Q ss
memory. If the reouest is to remove a soecific segment, the
task is straight forevard: a call is made to the Kernel
primitive Gatekeeper .Swap_Cut (Seg_*). If the renuest is to
remove a snecific segment, a LRU algorithm (approximation)
is used to determine which segrent to remove. When this is
done the Kernel call is made and the Memory_Ran dler data
'hases ar? updated to reflect the segment removal.
5 preliminary analysis of memory requirements
indicates that process linear virtual me rrn ry will n eed to be
at least 24K bytes. The driving factor in this calculation
is the fact that two data segments 'possibly SK bytes each)
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may be reauired in process memory during the copying of a
lata file into the lata file "buffer" . A 24?' byte memory
woull allow for the worst <~ase, viz., or.e SS byt Q se^Ter 1:
positioned in the middle of linear memory? toot, would still
exist for the two 3X byte segments.
6. Inout/Out out Process
The 10 rrocess is the second of the two processes
which act OTi behalf nf a H^st system to provide a reoues f ed
file r.ar.a^pfner. t service. The 10 rrocess acts ir a slave mode
to the F M o r ^ c e s s : e c ° i r e s its commands the
process via the shared mail_hox: segment described in
connection with the FM process.
The 10 process is responsible, as the name implies,
for all input and output between the Supervisor and the Host
systems. The 10 process is ~o^pose1 of five modules as
depicted in figure 1? (along with Kernel calls). Two of
these modules, Segment^andler and Memory_Handler , are the
same modules as described i^ th° F v process a^d will not b°
discussed further. Their task is to trir.g into the virtual
memory of the IC p^oces^ the data segments into and from
which "ost files are stored or read. Note that since
discretionary security checks are done ir the ? v process,
the IC process does not have to repeat these checks.
Direct invocation of the Packet Handler ^ r ^ u 1 a from
the IC_Commani_-andler module is uossible to send Host



















































Pi^ure 18, 10 Process Module
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File_Haniler module is first called to perform the read or
store operation.
The 10 process is also responsible for FSS-Host
Drotoccl. ^ata is transferee between Host and 755 via fixed
size packets". Ther° are three formats for these pacxets:
1) a synchronization packet format, 2) a commani packet
format ard , 3' a data packet format. Figure 19 gives the
logical construction of the data and command packets. The
sy 1"1 chr or i zat io r pac^e* is left for later design in
correction with the desi^*1 for a n ost interface. The packet
size of 521 bytes for da f a ar."< command packets was chosen to
maximize lata transfer efficiency at the expense of
ircreasirg the rnrnr^ard pack°t size. Because 512 bytes is the
size of the smallest Supervisor segment, this was chosen as
She "unit" of data transfer.
5 protocol must ^xist that insures reliable
transmission and ^f^ceptior "f packets by both the sender and
receiver in the FSS-Host packet exchange. The simplest
protocol that will handle packet transmission is to transmit
packets one at a time and wait for packet acknowledgement
before sending the next packet. The following diagram













































Figure IP. Packet Construction
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Operating ir this fashion is extremely inefficient,
especially in the transmission of large data files! it does
not allow the sender to send rackets before an
acknowledgement is received nor does it allow the receiver
to accept rrore that one packet at a tine (i.e., read ah a ad
and write behind). A multi-packet protocol is necessary to
take advantage of a read ahead and write behind scheme.
In specif in,? a multi-packet protocol, some means of
distinguishing individual packets rust be established. This
is done by giving each packet a seouence number carried in
the packet heai°r. The receiver returns acknowledgements
indicating the sentence rubber of the packet(s) received and
accepted (i.e., no errors detected). The number of packets
that may be transmitted before an acknowledgement is
received is called the packet "window width". Packet
transmission is controlled by ar algorithm which uses packet
seauence numbers and the window width. At System
initialization time and anytime a command packet is
received, the seauence number of the FSS is reset to zero.
Thus the first seouence number expected by the 755 upon
system initiation fand afterwards upon command completion)
is zero.
"^or an explanation of how the packet window works,
let Nft) denote the transmitted seauence number n f the
current packet and let N(t+1) denote the next expected
seouence number. The window width is denoted by W. At the
start of communication, e.g., when a ^ost sends a command to
34

the FSS , the Host is allowed to transmit packets bearing
seai:er.ce numbers in the ranae d^H(t )<"'>!. The receiver expects
the packets to arrive i~ correct seauential orler. As they
arrive, packets are checked for correctness (at both the
hariware ( rJSAPT) and software level)? an incorrect packet is
iiscaH Q d and ^ay he considered 'lost'. Let tee seouence
number of a particular correctly received packet be S. If
3=N(t-|-l) (i.e., the exp Q rted packet 1*, then the packet is
received in the correct seouence a n i it should be accepted
by the receiver and ar acknowlei cement sent with the proper
seouence number (in this case, S) to the sealer. If
S^U(t M l) , then the packet is a repetition of a packet
previously received by the receiver! the second transmission
may be due t o ei + her a lost or delayed acknowledgement. The
receiver should generate another acknowledgement and send it
to the sender ard otherwise ignore the packet. If S.^'M(t + l),
then the packet is aheaS of seouence, indicating that an
earily pac>et has bee' l^st' such a packet should be ignored
and an "error" acknowledgement sent so the packet can be
ret ra^ smi tt ed .
The arrival of acknowledgements at the sender also
ne°ds to be discussed. As each acknowledgement arrives, the
sender can delete the copy it has retained of the
Corresponding packet. As packets are acknowledged, fresh
parkets can be transmitted, i.e., when packet ?. has been
acknowledged, packet W can be sent. Acknowledgements can get
lost in transmission as well as packets. If a received
ac.

acknowledgement does not refer to the earliest transmitted
packet avaitin.£ a cknowled verier f , the'1 , in this protocol, the
sender may safely delete all packets up to and including
that T, efer Pri cei by the acknowledgement • Against each copy of
a transmitted packet will te noted a time (i.e., the
time-out.) by which time the packet rust fee acknowledged.
Failing such an acknowledgement, the packet must te
jre transmitted with its original seauence number. A packet
will only te receive! in sequential order, so it will te
necessary to re^ra^s^it n *"> t only the earliest unacknowledged
packet, tut also all later packets. The following figure
illustrates this protocol. The aueues should be considered




^H 1 i. <= WWM 5 g 7
In this figure, the sender is node A and the
receiver is node B. Node A has sent out packets 3,4, and 5,
the last of which is still in transit to 3. Node 3 :as
received all packets up to and including 4. It has just
acknowledged 3 and 4 and is ready to accept 5,6, and 7 when
they arrive in order. When node A receives acknowledgement
for 3 and 4. it will te able to transmit successfully
backets 5 and 7.
This pro + oc n l insures that packets are handled in
ae

seauential order which will insure that the lata is receive!
aid stored correctly. It also assure? positive control over
the receipt and transmission of packets? a necessary
reaui rement to prevent buffer overflow and loss cf data.
The r ernel controls all the hardware assets, as
explained in Chapter 1. Kernel calls are therefore necessary
to transfer packets between the FSS and the Host systems.
The format of these T/errel rails are:
Gatekeeper. Setup (Buff_Addr, Mode, Status)
Gatekeeper .Send_?acket 'Offset, Status)
Gatekeeper ,Store_?acket (Offset, Status)
Gatekeeper . Change_Byt e_Coun ter (#_of_Bytes, Status)
Each hardware port is virtualized into a" input a^.d
an output port. Tach virtual port has associated with it a
unit control block (UCB) at the Kernel level. The elements
of these UC 1 arp :
3yt e_Counter : This element is used to ieep track of
the number of bytes that have been transmitted o" received.
This counter is modulo "packet size" so that oi.ce packets
are synchronized, they should remain so. It can be altered
by the Change_Byte_Counter call in order to get the 7SS and
Fost back into packet synchronization.
Buff er_Add ress : This is the starting addrpss in the
input/out buffer where rackets will be plared (incommine) or




T uf fer_T.ensth: This element is the length (in
packets) of the if put /output buffer. This allows the Kernel
to perform automatic wrap around at the eni of the buffer.
Wir_dov_Width : This element is used by the in out port
UC3 to prevent buffer over flow. Each invocation of
Store_Packet will advance the window and allow another
packet to be stored into the 10 buffer. If a Host system
violates protocol by sending too many packets, the Kernel
will dump them to a "bit bucket". This element is used by
the output port to control the number of packets that the
PSS is able to send to a Host before receiving an
acknowleicjerre'1 1 . ilthoush this parameter (viz., window
width) may be different for the various Host systems, it
should ^ot char.se often and car therefore be set at system
initialization.
TTn~ a s f ore operation ( F 5 3 to receive packets), a
Setuo call is used to set the input UC3 base address to the
initial storage location in the 10 buffer. A Setup call is
also reauirei to set the output "JCB with the base address in
the 10 buffer from which acknowledgments will be sent. It
should be noted here that the 10 buffer in the 10 process is
the location that packets are checked for errors and
"enpacketed" or "depacketed". It is just a intermdiate stop
for data and neither the final destination nor origin of
da ta .
Subseauert Kernel calls to Store_?acket will return
the location of the next packet in the 10 buffer to be
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processed. The Kernel will store ahead into the 10 buffer
durine the store operation hut will not over write the
buffer. That is, each call to the Kernel will indicate that
a new packet location is open. The 10 process will control
which packets ''and how ma^y) are se n t to the ?SS by proper
use of acknowledgements 'for both correct and incorrect
packet s ) .
Two Setup calls a^e also necessary for a send
operation. They again set the virtual input/output oorts for
the transfer of packets from the 7S 5 to a Host. Subsequent
calls to Send_Packet indicate that a Pac.-cet is ready to be
transmitted. The 10 process knows wh OTi it can discard a
packet by the acknowledgments it receives from the Host
The f,hange_"D yte_Coi , n ter primitive is used by the
synchronization p^ocedur t<" shift a UC3 byte counter in
order to bring packet transmission back into
synchronization. (Synchronisation may be reauired during a
temporary communication interruption or system start up.)
The following is a description of the three 'new
modules which make un the TO process.
a. Input/Output Command Handler Mrdule
't the top of the 10 process module hierarchy is
the IO_ComraTid _Fand ler module fsee Appendix C, p. 117). This
module is responsible for the interface with the F M orocess.
Communication between the processes is via the mail bor
oa

shared segment ard synchronization is through the use of an
eventcour.t ard the Kernel primitives TICKET, ?D7ANCE aH
AWAIT. The procedures of this module alon,? with their
input/output parameters are listed in figure 2?.
The TO_ r, md_ tTnd procedure, like the 7^_Cmd_ und
procedure a case statement, routes FM process instructions
to a specific TO^ommand^andler procedure for action.
The procedure involved when the Host command is
not a R v ^Vi_ v Jl v or STOR^Tl 7 reauest is the IO_CmdJ!nd_Ack
procedure. This p'ore^u'10 is able t n invoke the
?acket_Handler -nodule directly for performing directed (by
the Ff process) Hos f acknowledgement a^d^r data transfer
from the shared mail_tcx segment.
The IO_Od_H-1_Send and IO_Cmd_Hnd_Store
procedures are relatively straight forward. They provide the
IC-FM process interface required for a x2AD_FILS or
3T0r"F_TIL" TJ ost reouest. ^oth procedures call the
?ile_Hardler nodule tn po-fnr^ the actual file manipulation.
h. "ile T-T andler Module
The File_Eandler module is required for file
manipulation in the TO process and is the level in toe IC
process a* which files ar° known. The procedures which ma>e
up this module alon^ with their input/out out parameters are
listed in fi<*ur a 21. 3 s mentioned ahove, there are only two
Host requests that reouire the 10 process to bring data



















B o t . M s ff . Pathname
Mail_ T, ox.Ms2.T, iie_Size
Mail_3 ,, T.Msp.Path*, arn e
Mail Pox .Ms? .File Size
Figure 2?. IC_Co ,,ina^d_Ear.iler Module





Mail_3ox .Ms?. Pathname File_Succ_Code
v ail BOT.Msff.File Size
'ile_rn1_ MailJ^ox.Msff . Pathname
Store File Mail Box. Msff. File Size
' i 1 e S u c c Cole
Figure 21. File_Fandler Module
Procedure In put /Out put Parameters
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STORF_FTIF. Note that since file size is tassel from the F v
nrocess, and the *he access to the data files involved is
controlled in the FM nrocess, data file segments can be
brought directly into 10 process memory a^d any requirement
for the IC process to access directory files (other than
tree traversal) is eliminated. Because the terminal nodes in
the tree traversal are controlled by the FM urocess, the
paths to these terminal nodes will not be alterable until
control is released by the rM process.
The Fi le_Hand ler module consist of two
procedures, "c, ile_ TJnd__Send_'c'ile 'for Host command R5AD_FIIE)
and File_H-d_Sto~p_File (for Host command S rORF_FILF) . Both
procedures operate in a similar manner. Upon receiving a
pathname a^d file size ^ro^ the FM process, these procedures
use the Segment Randier procedures to bring the necessary
data file 'segment(s)) into process menor?/. A call is then
made to the ?acket_Handler module to transfer data from/to
specified segments.
The order of events in the reading and storing-
of data files follows the following sequences. For a
R^KD_71L V operation. the order of actions ta'^en by the
Supervisor are:
1) discretionary and non-discretionary checks
are made in *he FM process.
2) \ copy is made of the data file into a
per-process data file buffer.





directory data is read by the FM process) is
passed to the TO orocess alor? with the file size. The 10
process ca^ 1e f er^i"e the file si?e from the file directory
tut by passing file size to the 10 process, this stet> is
eliminated for the 10 process.
4) The read takes place in the 10 process.
5^ The 10 p^cess returns to the FM process with
a success code of "read complete" or an appropriate error
code. The 0"ly reason for a read operation to fail in the 10
process is the receipt of an abort command from the Host or
a 'time out' which would occii** if the Host stopped sending
for some unexplained reason.
6) The F M orocess instructs the 10 process to
acknowledge the "read complete" or tc send the appropriate
error code. The data file read buffer is then free for
further use.
If the operation is a ST0ft3_FILE operation the
following steps are taken by the Supervisor:
1) Dis ere t
i
nrary and non-discretionary security
checks are made by the FM process.
2) A temporary file is created by the Supervisor
large enough to store the file in. appropriate use of the
synchronization primitives prevents this temporary file from
being used by Tore than one process at a time.
3) The pathname of the temporary file is sent to
the 10 Drocess and t v e 10 process stores the file into the
temporary file.

4) The 10 process returns a success code to the
t^ process and the "^M process updates the directory to
reflect the new file (viz., Entry_Name of temporary file is
changed to the old file ?ntry_Name) . The old file is then
deleted by the 7M process.
5) The FM process then instructs the 10 process
to acknowledge the "store complete" . There is no reason a
store operation should fail other than an explicit abort
reauest by the Host system or hardware failure.
c. Packet Handler Module
The Packet _Hard ler module does the actual
transfer of data between the ^SS and the Host system and is
the 10 process level at which the concept of "packet" is
known. The procedures of this module alons with their
input /output parameters are listed in figure 22. The tasks
that this module must perform are: 1) synchronization of
packets, 2^ err^r detection, 2) packet acknowledgement, and
4) transfer of data to/from Supervisor segments. Ti^ure 23
is a finite state diagram of packet transfer.
The synchronization task is performed on the
svstem IPL and whenever packet synchronization is lost
thereafter, ^rror detection and reauest for retransmission
upon error detect i n ^ a^e com pi
i
rectory functions which are
performed on every packet received from a Host.
Packed transfer during synchronization





















'ieure 2.2. Packet_Handler Module







*\ ( 3erd "\
ty V, Packets ;
vi^u'-e 23. Finite State Piasrran of Packet Transfer
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synchronization procedure + ^ besin synchronization in the
middle of the first packet and still have two packets to
confirm synchroni zat ion when it is achieved.
Packet transfer of command packets occurs one at
a time. The reason for this is that each command oaci-tet must
he acted upon in a synchronous manner. Data packet read
ahead and write behind is permitted to increase the transfer
rate of data packets. The number of packets that are allowed
to be sent or stored depends on the IC tuffer size. The
?acket_Handler module is also responsible for data
"enpacketins" and "depacketing" for the FSS.
The ?k_Hnd_Synr procedure is used to synchronize
packet transmission. It is explicitly called at I?L and
wherever the packet synchronization is lost by the Host
systen. It is invoked implicitly by th a FSS whenever a
packet is not able to be decoded 'viz., the packet type and
packet check-sum are incorrect).
The ?k_End_Ack procedure is used to send
acknowledgements to the ^ost systems. This procedure will
always be called ''•o^ the IO_Command_Handler module which
will reauire the ?acket_Eandler module to either acknowledge
the Host with a specific message or to send some data
located in a mail_box segment buffer to the Host.
The Pk_Hnd_5end procedure is used to transfer
data segments from the FSS to a Host system. This procedure
is called from the File_Handler module which makes sure that
the correct data segment is in process memory for the
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transfer, The segment number along with the number of "bits
that are reouired to be transferee! are passed to this
procedure from the File_Handler module. This procedure then
transfers the sesment until the specified number of bits
have been transmitted. A success code is returned when
action is complete.
The ?k_ TT nd_S tore procedure worlcs in a manner
completely analogous to the ?k_Hnd_Eead procedure.

III. CONCLUSIONS
ft . STATUS 07 RFS^SCH
This design applies state of the art software and
hardware to solve the secure multilevel computer problem in
a file storage system. It presents an inexpensive but highly
nowerful design for a system based on a micro-computer tut
not restricted to a micro—ccmDuter environment, i.e., there
is ro rastictior on the type of Host computer system
serviced by *he 3TSS. Implementation of this design en Z8002
hardware along with the analysis of ?SS design parameters
(Appendix ft ) are f a s ,j" s left to be Ice.
There are two major classes of applications for the FSS.
One application uses the YSS as a system file system (e.g..
for distributed micros ^. This implies that the total system
is ^ul t i 1 e ir el secure with nri ly one secur Q component (viz.,
the Kernel). It must be noted, however, that in this
configuration, the distributed Hosts (i.e., the micros) have
no autonomous life.
The other class of applications, involves using the JSS
as ore element of a net of autonomous Host systems. In this
Configuration, the FSS provides facilities for controlled
data sharing ard communication.
An obvious direct application of the FSS, is for
shipboard use ! e.s., for the 5;\.8 ?-II system [Smith]) or for
use at other installations where data would be more
efficiently used if controlled lata sharing were allowed.
C.C

8 major desisrn choice of the ?33 which allowed the
Kernel to he kept small 'and. therefore more easily
veTif iatle > , was the elimination of the discretionary
security from the r ernel domain to the Supervisor domain.
The implication of this choice is that each Host system is
responsible for its own discretionary security; not an
unreasonable recuest or design choice.
The ne^t major task to he accomplished in this project
is FSS implemen t at i on . This will not he a trival task, cut
it is felt that the designs Dresented in this thesis and the
companion work done by Colenan provide a solid basis.
3 . FOLLOW ON WORK
This desir*1 is a specific implementation of one member
of a family cf oneratir, s systems based on the Security
Kernel concept discussed by 0'Cci.nell and ?.i chard son
[O'Connell]. Ther? are obvious areas that this design could
be expanded and generalized" areas that should be e^a^i^e^.
after a successful first implementation. Some of these areas
are
:
'operator' terminal interface funcior.s
expa r dei H^st co rr"na ri ^s
map of different 'user' names in different Hosts to a
common "user" in the ^SS
data c n npac*io^ onto secondary stnra r^ Q
multilevel n osts
moving discretionary security into the Kernel domain
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dynamic tjt^cpss crea f io" 'deleti or .
These are just a few of the many possible areas r or
e^pansio^ that cmil r? "be explored. r e area not mentioned in
the list tut an area that should be looked at luring the
initial i mule^er ta + icn is for a way to prevent the
Supervisor from suffering a '-segment fault*. The present
arrangement, with a fault handler, is not efficient or
elegant '. Si^ce the deletion of a segment is controlled by
the Delete Segment Kernel primitive, a method of leaving an
'orphan' copy in crocess memory would eliminate the fault
cor di t i °n . The o^ly operation that would he defined on this
'orphan' would he a r'elet e_ Segnen t command by a co^ess to
remove i f from process m em^ry. After it had teen deleted by
all processes, the cony could te destroyed, g variation of
this scheme would, upon a Kernel Swap_Ir. call, swap into
process memory a per-process copy of the desired segment.
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Mot Terminal T ile
FM_Command_Eandler
Module
Li rec tory Control
Module
Vri te_Acces s_ N l ot_Al lowed
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TPUE : = 1
NULL := 9}
EXTERNAL







RETURNS /T, IR SUCC CODE ^YTE)
















RETURNS 'DIP SUCC COD r "°YTE
DlR~PATHNAME STRING)




DIR_CNTRL UPDATE PROCEDURE 'MSG- BYTE
US VRID BYTE
PATHNAME STRING)
PETUPNS fDI c _SUCC_CODE BYTP)
!to update directory after io process




GLOBAL Jmodule entry noint!














OX. MSI. INST := EEAD_CMD
OX. MSG. PATHNAME := NULL
OX. MSG. FILE SIZE := NULL
OX.MSG.SUCC~CODE := NULL
ATEXEEPER. TICKET [MAIL BOX,
FPEF. ADVANCE (MAIL BOX^ S^
EPFR. AWAIT (MAIL ?OX, C, (t+2))
L BOX. MSG. INST = CMP ?K READY
)
jv post HMD
SE PFLET^_FILE THEN 3 V_CMD_HNT EEL3T3_FILE
S3 CPEATE FILE THEN FM_CMD_HND CREATE~FILE
c;t? fR^T 7 LINK THEN FM CMD UND~CR3 AT 7 Lll'. v.
S? R3AD FILE THEN F v_C^r_HND_aEAI FILE
S3 STORE *IL3 THEN FM CMD HND STOP E_FILE
S v RFAD»>L THFN FM CMP_HND RE«D A.CL
S3 ADD ACL ENTRY THFN FM_CM3_HND ADD ACL ENTRY
53 DELETE *CL_FNT !-, Y THEN FM CMD END_DEL ,rTF &CL ENT.i Y
SF a^ORT T^N FM CMP_HND_AFO"RT
IL_BOX.MSC-.INST := ACK HOST
IL BOX.MSG.PATEN»MF := NULL
IL_30X.MSG.FILF_SIZ? := NULL
IL_BOX.MSG.S TTCC_rCD^ :- ERROR CODE (ILLEGAL CMD)
:= C^T^F^P^R .TKtET (MAIL POt, C)
TEKEEPEP . iPVANCF (MAIL_3CX, C)



























BOX.MSG .INST := &CE HOST
"BOX.MSC.PSTHNAMF ?=~NULL
_3CX.MSG.FILT_SIZE : = NULL
_BCX.M5G.SUCC CODE := EI-iROR CODE (CMD ?I EXPECTED)
CAT T,F T
'
5, P T'R. TICKET 'MAIL POX, C)
KEEPER. ADVANCE (MAIL_B0X, C)





MSG = "PYT 7
FM_CMD_HND_DELETE_FILE PROCEDURE
ENTRY









I T DIR SUCC_SO?* = TRUE
THEN
MAIL BOX. MSG. INST := ACK HOST
M*IL_?OX. MSG. PATHNAME : = NULL
MAIL~BOX.MSG.FILE_SIZE := NULL
MAIL BOX. MSG.SUCC~CODE := FILE DELETED
t := GA.TEKETER. TICKET I'M AIL BOX , C)
GATEKEE?E D .ADVANCE (MAIL_3GX, C)
GATEKEEPER
.
AW,A IT (MAIL BOX, C, (t+2))
TLSE
MAIL_3CX.MSG.INST := A,CK_HOST
MHL_BCX. MSG. PATHNAME := NULL
Mfl.IL BOX. MSG. FILE SIZE := NULL
MAIL_3CX.MSG.SUCC_C0EE : = ERROR_COBE (DIR_SUCC_COBS
!file not found; write access to directory
not nermi tted
!
t : = GATEKEEPER. TICKET 'MAIL_BCX, C)
GATEKEEPER. *D7 A NCE (MAIL 30X"i C)
GATEKEEPER. AW AIT (MAIL BOX, 3, (t+2))
EI
END EM CMD END DELETE FILE
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ns dir succ code!
_SUCC_CODE = TRUE
_FOX . M S"- .INST := »CK_HOST
BOX. MSG. PATHNAME := NULL
'BOX.MSG.FILE_SIZE := NULL
_FOX. M SG.S Tjr",
_
r, Or> ? : = FILE CREATED






AW* IT (M*IL 'OX, C, 't+2))
_B0X.MS5.IMST := »CK_HOST
FOX. MSG. PATHNAME ;» NULL
_BOX.MSG.FILE_SIZE := NULL
_30X. MSG.SUCC_CODE : = ERROR_CODE (DIR_SUCC_CODE)
ectory not found; write access to directory
permitted? directory full!
GATEKEEPER. TICKET (MAIL_30X, C)
TTP-rprp
. apv a yrv (MAIL EOX, C)
KEEPER. AWAIT (MAIL_BCX,
MV
































SUCC CODE - TFUE

















_BOX. MSG. INST := ACE HOST
BOX. MSG. PATHNAME : = NULL
_?OX.MSG.^IL i;,_SIZ^ := NULL
_3CX.MSG.SUCC_CCDE : = LINK CREATED
GATEKEEPER. TICKET 'MAIL BOX, C)
KEEPER
.
'DV'NCt fvaiL BOX, C)
KEEPER. AW A IT (MAIL RCX , C 't+2))
ILJBOX. MSG. INST := a n K_ROST
IL_BCX.MSG.?MHNA ME : = NULL
IL~BOX. MSG. PILE SIZE :» NULL
ILJBOX. M SG.SUrc_COD 7 ?= ^RROR_CODE ( DIR_SUCC_COD
irectory not found; write access to directory
ot permitted? directory full!
:= GAT'E^P^R .TICKET (MAIL BOX, C)
TEEEEPER. ADVANCE (MAIL BOX
"J C)
TEKEEPER.AWAIT (MAILJBOX, C, (t+2))
CMD HND CREATE LINE
1?8

FM_CMD READ FILE PROCEDURE
ENTRY
I? FILE TY?e = P 8 T 4
THEN
MSG := READ FILE




! returns dir succ code, di
IE DIF_SUCC_CODE = TRUE
TUV H
MAIL_BOX. MSG. INST := REA
MA IL~BOX. MSG. PATHNAME : =
MAIL_?CX .MSG. FILE SIZE i
MAIL BOX. MSG. SUCC~C ODE :
t := GATEKEEPER. TICKET (
GA TttkeedtRl . JT!V s NCE, 'M a IL
GATEKEEPER. AWAIT ' (MAIL B






!update will not fail
!
^ 8 !L_'OX. MSG.IMST : = B
MAI L_30X. MSG. PATHNAME
MAIL~BOX. MSG. FILE SIZE
MAI LJ^OX.^SG. SUCC fCD 7
t := GATEKEEPER. TICKET
GATEKEEPER .A D7 A NCR (MA
GATEK^EP'R . a.W*IT (MAIL
ELSE
MAIL BOX. MSG. INST : = A
MATT, t» OX . MSG.? 8 T° NAME
MAIL_30X.MSG.EILE_SIZE
MAIL__30X.MSG.SUCC_C0DE
!error code returned f
!file rot found by io
file read aborted by
file read aborted by
cri3 packet received!
t := GATEKEEPER .TICKET
GATEKEEPER
.




MAIL_BOX.MSG.INST : = S CK
MAIL_RCX . M S rr .PATHNAME : =
MAIL~30X. MSG.FILE SIZE :
MAIL~BOX.MSG.SUCC~CODE :
Ifile not found:
read access to file not
e_size !
















































:= G,;'TE*'FFPEP .TICKET ("«IL_30X, C)
1<pypvp-PT?
.
ar;v» NCE ' MS IL ""OX, C)
TEKEEPER. AWAIT (MAIL BOX , "c , (t+2))
ILS_TYPF = DIRECTORY
TT\J













acl<: ri ^wlediP,p ,rier
t,
: = G ATEKEEPEE






MAILJPOX . W S^ .SU
! d i r e c t n ry not
read access to
I • = GATEKEEPER
GATEKEEPER. ADVA
3A.TEEEEPEP . AW? I
>RY (MSG
USEPID







THIMSM 17 : = NULL
LE_SIZE := NULL
CC__CODF := DIR_READ_COMPLETE
fered from dir_fcuf fer;
t s on t !
•TICKET 'MiIL_BCX, C)
\irtr ''mjil^-sox, C)
T (MAIL_30X, C, (t+2))
ST :- AC" HOST
THNAME := NULL
LE__STZE := NULL





NCE (MAIL BOX^ C)
























BOX. MSG. INST := ACK_HOST
"BOX. MSG. PA THNAME := NULL
POX.MSG.-IL^SIZ" := NULL
















try data trar.sf ered fron dir_bufferJ
fenowled^ement sent!
= GATEKEEPER .TICKET MAIL BOX, C)
EKEEPER.ADVNCE MAIL BOX"| C)
EKEEPER .AWAIT (MA.ILJPOX, C, (t+2))
L_P0X.MSCt.INST := ACK_HOST
L BOX. MSS. PATHNAME := NULL
L_BOX.MSG.FILE_STZE := ^JULL
L_"POX .*SG .SUCC'CODE : = ERROR_CODE (DIR_SUCC_CODE)
le not found; read access to file not permitted!
= G&.TEKEEPE 13 . TICKET (MAIL BOX, C)
vyvvvvv
m
iT,y inc.v (MAIL POXl C)
EKEEPER. AWAIT f MAIL BOX, C, (t+2))
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Ireturns dir pathname » dir su-cc code!
IE DIR_SUCC_"6^ = TRUE
THEN
MAIL_BOX.MSC-.IMST := STORE_EILE
MAILJBOX .MS" .P^T^NAM* •- DIR PATHNAME
MAIL_30X.MSG.EILE_SIZE := EILE_SIZE
MAlL~BOX.MSG.SUCC_CODE := MULL
t := C-aTT^P^R .TICKET 'MAIL_POX, C)
GATEKEEPER. ADVANCE (MAIL BOX, C)
GATEKEEPER. *WA IT (MAIL_BOX, C, (t+2))
IE MAIL POX.MSG.SUCC_CODE = TRU"1:
THEN
MS 5 := U?DATE_STORE
BTR '"NTRL UPDATE '^SC-
USE^ID
PATHNAME)
Jupdate will not fail!
MAIL_3CX.MSG.INST := ACK_HCST
MAIL_BOX.MSG. PATHNAME := NULL
MAIL_RCX.MSG.ETLE_SIZ T' t- NULL
MAIL~B0X.MSG.SUCC"C0DE : = STORE COMPLETE





HC V 'msj_ to 7r n
)
GATEKEEPER'.' AWAIT (MAIL 30X, C, (t+2) )
ELSE
M SIL_BOX. wSG.INST := » r'K_ TTOST
MA IL_30X.MSG. PATHNAME := NULL
MAIL POX. MSG.FILE SIZE ! = NULL
MA^BCX.MSG.SUCC^OE"? := MAIL_30X .MSG .SUCC_CCDE
terror returned from io process?
cmd packet received: irnurouer n-umter of data packets!
t := GATEKEEPER. TICKET (MAIL BOX, C)
GATEKEEPER. 8 DVANCE 'MML_BOX. C)
GATEKEEPER. AWAIT (MAIL BOX, C, (t+2))
EI
ELSE
MAIL BOX .MS nx.IMST := ?CE_HOST
MAIL'BOX. MSG. PATHNAME := NULL
MAIL~BOX. MSG. FILE SIZE := NULL
MAIL_BOX.MSG .SUOC~CODE := 'B,RROR_COBE (DIR_SUCC_CODE)
!file not for^d? write access to file not permitted!
t := GATEKEFPER. TICKET fMAIL_BOX, C)
GATEKEEPER . 8T! V »N ri? ( va IL POX, C)
GATEKEEPER. AWAIT (MAIL BOX, C, (t+2))
EI
















_RND_REA.D_ a CL ?RO" TTURE
:= READ_ACL







ns dir succ code!
_SUCC_CODE = TRUE
BCX.MSG.INST := ACK HOST
"BOX. MSG. PATHNAME : = NULL
_"POX.MS^.^IL^_STZ 7 := NULL
~BCX.MS&.SUCC~COI5E := ACL_?.EAL_CCM?LET:
data trar.sfered frox acl_buffer!
t acknowledgement sent!




"DVANCE (M*IL BOX^ C)
ir-r-rpTp
.


















IL POX. M37. INST := ^.r^ POST
IL^POX .MSG. PATHNAME := NULL
IL BOX.MSG.EILE_SIZE := NULL
IL_EOX.MS? ,SUCC_CODE := E?ROR_CODE (DIR_SUCC_CODE
)
ile not found; read access to directory file
r> f poT.rni t 1 5^ J
:= GATEKEEPER. TICKET (MAIL BOX, C)
ip-PTrT^pTp
# spYtNjrtr f^aiL_?CX, C)
TEKEEPER. AWAIT (MAIL_BOX, C. (t+2))
r MD FN 7) ?E a T3 ACL
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vm CMD END A Tit! tr L ENTRY PRO^EPUR"7
ENTRY






























is dir sue c code!
_SUCC_CODE = TRUE
_BCX. M SG.IMST := ACE HOST
"BOX. MSG. PATHNAME r= NULL
_^OX.MSG.EIL T_SIZ^ : = NULL
_30X.MSG.SUC{TC0DE := ACL_ENTRY_AEEED
GATEKEEPER. TICKET (MAIL BOX, C)
KEEPER. ADVANCE (M«IL BOXT C)
KEEPER. AWAIT (MAIL_30X, C, (t-2))
BOX. MSG. INST := ACK HOST
_30X. MSG .PATHNAME := NULL
_BOX.MSG.EILE_SIZE
~BOX. MSG.SU^C_CODE
e v n + found 5 write
mi t ted" acl_er. try
rtimTftTnrpir^
. TI CE^T
KEEPER .ADVANCE (MAIL_BOX7 C)
KEEPER. 'WAIT (MAIL_BOX, C. ( t +2 )
:= MULL
? = ERROR_CODE (DIR_SUCC_CODE)
_
access to directory not
' n o o
1
" em x> t y
!
'MAIL T OX, C)













Ireturns dir succ code!
IE DIR SUCC COD? = TRUV
THEN'
MAIL BOX. MSG. INST := «CK_HCST
MS
. II "FOX .MSG . ? iT^N 8 ME := MULL
MAIL~30X.*MSG. TILE SIZE := MULL
MAIL~BOX.MSG.SUCC~CODE := SCL_ENTPY_DELETED
I := '1«T T'K rT ?'rR .TICKET 'MAIL ^OX, C)
GATEKEEPER. ADVANCE (MAIL_?OXT C)
GATEKEEPER. AW A IT fMAIL 30X, C, ft +2))
'LS v
MAIL_BOX. MSG. INST := »Cr_HOST
MA IL~30X. MSG. PATHNAME := MULL
M siI_ECX .MSG .TIL T _SIZ T • = MULL
MAIL_30X.MSG.SUCC_C0DE := ERRCR_CODE (DIR_SUCC_COPl
!file not found? write access to directory not
permitted !
t := GATEKEEPER. TICKET ' M AIL_^OX, C)
GATEKEEPER . S DV*NCE f!* ! IL_3CX, C)
SflTEKEvp^R.
.
S W&IT (M S IL ^CX , p , ft +2))
EI









Isto^e c^d n e°^f to fres temporary file!
MAIL_?OX. MSG. INST := ACK ^OST
MAIL BOX. MSG. PATHNAME := NULL
M/IL~BOX.MSG.ETLE_SIZE : = NULL
MAIL~POX.MSG .SUCCOR 15, := CMP ARORT IP
t := GATEKEEPER. TICKET (MAILBOX, C)
GATEKEEPER. ADVANCE 'MAILBOX. C )
GATEKEEPER
.
S WA IT (MAIL T OX, r , ^+2))
END Fm2cMD_END_A30?.T





pr_HND_STORTr PROCEDURE fSEG * DWORD
SIZE" LWORD) Inumter cf bits!
RETURNS (PK_SUCC_CODE BYTE)
PK_HND_SEND PRO^CURE (SEG_# LWORD
SIZE LWOP.D) !ru.Tb Q r cf bits!
RETURNS ' PK Sure "ODE ^YTE)
?E_HNr_ACE_HCST procedure (msg BYTE)
PILE TT N'C_SEMTi_^IL 7 PROC^UR 7 (PATHNAME STRING
RETURNS (EILE_SUCC_CODE BYTE)
ElLE_HND_ST0?.EJFILE PROCEDURE f?*THN*ME STRING)
RETURNS i'EILE_SUCC_COrE 3YTE)
I m TERN AL
10 CMD RN 7-) ^ROC^URT
ENTRY
t := TICKET fM»IL_ROX, C^
AWAIT f'MAIL BOX, C, ( t + 1) ^
DC
IE MiIL_BOX.MSG.INST
CASE R^D C MT) T^EN PE %WD R ?4 D CMD
CASE ACKSOST THEN ?K_HND~ACE_E0ST
fM«IL BOX. MSG. SUCC CODE)
CASE SEND_EIL^ TH^N mT?_^ND_RE4 D_EI LE
(mail~3cx.msg. Pathname
( M fi I L_B OX . MS G . El L E_S I Z E
)







t := TICEET ( MAIL_BOX, C)
ADVANCE (MAIL BOX^ C)
AWAIT (MAILJPOX, C, ( (t+2)
CD
END IO_CMD_HND
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